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Abstract: In the months leading up to the 2012 Presidential Election, a number of Republican 
candidates that were vying for the nomination against the incumbent, Barack Obama, made 
sensational claims regarding the “Nuclear Iran Question”. This study discusses the issue of a 
nuclear Iran, what this means for regional stability, and what America’s options are in dealing 
with the Islamic Republic. Specifically the researcher addresses the consequences of a strike on 
Iran’s nuclear facilities, conducting a discourse analysis for the purposes of demonstrating the 
polarizing affect this issue has had on some of the leading scholars, theorists and 
practitioners. The central argument of this study states that the growing consensus of military 
intervention in the US and Israeli defense community must be curbed. Military action against 
Iran would produce more negative than positive outcomes. Despite recent claims from President 
Obama, diplomacy has not been exhausted. Therefore the author suggests the need for an 
overhaul in diplomatic measures toward Iran. In order for the US, Iran, and Israel to begin an 
era of warmer relations, the US is in the best position to begin negotiations based on equanimity 
and tolerance.  
 
 
 
Keywords: US-Iran relations, Iran-Israel relations, Nuclear Non Proliferation, 1953 overthrow of 
Mohammad Mossadegh, 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, track I Diplomacy, 
Rapprochement, Rogue state narrative.   
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 7 
Introduction 
 
In the early months of the 2012 United States Presidential election, a number of 
Republican candidates made their views on American foreign policy known at the various 
debates that took place around the country. Their tone was shrill and aggressive, 
imploring and sensationalistic. The exception was Congressman Ron Paul, whose foreign 
policy views have received harsh criticism from other candidates. At one debate in South 
Carolina, when asked about America's Middle East policy, Paul made a statement 
suggesting the removal of all forces from both Iraq and Afghanistan, and allowing Iran to 
proceed with its nuclear research unchecked by international bodies, citing the Golden 
Rule of “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”. It was no surprise that 
Paul’s isolationist views received jeers from the audience. On the other hand, the 
characterization of Governor Mitt Romney’s position on the “Nuclear Iran Question” is 
nothing short of fear mongering; leading those who watch to believe that a nuclear Iran is 
undoubtedly a threat to US national security. In reality Iran has provided no substantive 
reason to believe an attack on the US—or Israel, for that matter—would result from 
obtaining nuclear materials. The views of many hardline Republicans echo that of Israel's 
Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who is outspoken in his belief that Iran's nuclear 
program must be stopped—by force.  
 In examining the multitude of newspaper articles that have been published 
between 2010 and 2012, there emerges a sense of frustration from Israel, which has made 
repeated threats to attack Iran in spite of President Obama's policy to proceed with 
sanctions and negotiations. Phrases that repeatedly crop up in articles include “All 
options on the table”, “Imminent threat” and “Preemptive Strike”—in other words, 
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phrases denoting confrontation, intolerance and a frightening readiness to engage in 
warfare. Obama's decision to pursue backchannel diplomacy in the face of increasing 
pressure from Israel is a somewhat positive indication that the United States foresees the 
dangerous road to which escalation can lead. And since President Obama has been 
reelected, there is a good chance the conflict will enter a new stage of either escalation or 
closure during his second term.  
Though these events are unfolding as we speak, scholars, theorists, journalists, 
and military and political strategists have been theorizing what might result from a direct 
assault on Iranian soil. The New York Times recently released an article that disclosed that 
a classified war simulation was held in March of 2012 to “assess the repercussions of an 
Israeli attack on Iran”. However, the results of the simulation are quite alarming: “The 
strike would lead to a wider regional war, which would draw in the United States and 
leave hundreds of Americans dead” (Mazzetti, 2012). In another article published by the 
Atlantic, a panel of academics, policymakers and journalists were assembled to assess the 
likelihood of war starting between Israel and Iran. The results found that, as of March 
2012, the chances of war occurring by the next year is 48%. This percentage comes in 
light of a recent note of urgency that has permeated Israel's rhetoric regarding Iran's 
nuclear development program being an existential threat to Israel. Israeli Defense 
Minister Ehud Barak said recently in an interview: “Whoever says 'later' may find that 
later is too late”. Barak has also implied, along with Prime Minister Benyamin 
Netanyahu, that Israel would not warn Washington before launching a unilateral strike on 
Iranian underground nuclear facilities (Tierney, 2012).  
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In my thesis, I ask the questions: Is warfare the best approach to dealing with 
Iran? If so, what would be the long-term consequences of a strike on Iranian soil? And 
finally, how can the US avoid a collision course with Iran? In answering these questions, 
I argue that in order to understand how significant and possibly destructive an attack on 
Iran can be, the perspective of Iran must be taken into consideration—which is 
surprisingly scarce in much of the contemporary academic literature from some of the 
leading forums and publications. Understanding Iran’s motives is important because the 
Iran the world knows today—the ultra-religious and violently repressive theocracy—is a 
result of its long and checkered relationship with the United States. To support this 
assertion, I use a historical lens to chart America’s role in Iran from World War II until 
the present time, focusing on key events—such as the overthrow of Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the US embassy 
hostage crisis in Tehran—and showing how they came to shape relations between the two 
nations. For this section I ask the question: What is the origin of the mutual enmity that 
currently exists between Iran and the United States? What factors contribute to Iran’s 
perceived need for nuclear technology? 
 Going back to the question of whether or not warfare is the best option for dealing 
with a nuclear Iran, I argue that a better alternative would be to pursue diplomacy. 
However, in order for diplomacy to be effective there needs to be a significant overhaul 
of current diplomatic measures toward Iran; meaning the policy of sanctions and isolation 
must be eliminated, or at the very least mitigated, in order for fruitful negotiations to take 
place. If the United States and Iran are in fact willing to truly begin a new era of warmer 
relations, Track I diplomacy, which requires face-to-face negotiations between 
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government officials, such as diplomats, and in some cases leaders, must be 
reestablished. The benefit of using Track I diplomacy is that face-to-face interaction will 
almost certainly remove the channel of misinformation that exists between the US and 
Iran, which allows more hearsay than truth to reach both sides. This being said, it should 
be acknowledged that no American president has had direct talks with an Iranian leader 
since the administration of Jimmy Carter. In short, establishing formal channels of 
diplomacy will facilitate transparency between the two governments.  
In presenting this argument, I review the opinions of international relations 
scholars and practitioners, many of who are in favor of a preemptive strike on Iranian 
nuclear facilities. However, most analysts recognize the absurdity of escalating the 
conflict. In conducting my research, I trace the current state of tension to America's role 
in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953. This set off a chain 
of events that resulted in terminating formal relations between the two nations, and the 
emergence of the current theocratic regime in Iran. From this historical lens it is clear the 
US was the instigator. It is also clear that it is ultimately the responsibility of the US to 
initiate the first overture expressing, if not goodwill, a willingness to participate in an 
exchange of equitable negotiation.  
Returning to Ron Paul's comments at the South Carolina debate, when he 
discussed US intervention in Iran, the crowd rejected the idea that the American 
government would do something as egregious as removing a democratically-elected 
leader in favor of a megalomaniacal monarch to suit its interests in the region. 
Unfortunately, that is exactly what we have done. This brand of collective ignorance is 
another consequence of the lack of dialogue between the two nations. In any case, lack of 
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information—whether it is the president, presidential-hopeful, or average citizens—is a 
dangerous thing. The most important point I would like readers of this study to take away 
is that, in deciding how to deal with an intransigent Iran, it is paramount to examine the 
historical events that have led to this stage in the protracted conflict. Moreover, 
understanding the relationship between these nations can hopefully allow one to make an 
informed decision as to whether or not diplomacy has in fact been utilized to its full 
potential. In doing so, one can truly understand the implications of bringing Iran to war.  
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Literature Review 
Historical Background – Chapter One (1940 – 1960) 
In the first section of my thesis I discuss the origin of US-Iran relations, dating back to 
the 1940s. In my analysis of scholarly works relating to the 1953 overthrow of 
Mohammad Mossadegh, there seems to be a bifurcation of opinion as to the initial reason 
for US participation in the coup. One school of thought claims the US became involved 
in response to what many scholars refer to as “Containment Theory”: steeped in the 
paranoid mentality of the Cold War rhetoric, this theory suggests that in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s the US feared the spread of communism in underdeveloped nations in the 
Middle East, Latin America and Asia. Rather than allow countries to fall under 
communism, the US would discretely embed itself into a vulnerable country and subvert 
the current government with a puppet regime. In addition to Iran, evidence of this can be 
found in numerous countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (Johnson, 
2004). 
 A second school of thought insists the encirclement theory is a front for true US 
intentions: US intervention was a result of Iran nationalizing its oil in 1952. In 1951, 
newly elected Prime Minister Mossadegh set out to break Iran from colonialist powers, 
and integrate it into the world economy. To do this, Iran had to take control of its vast oil 
reserves, which were under the control of the British. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC) had been created in the late nineteenth century when a British geologist named 
William Knox D’Arcy was sent into Iran to check for oil fertility. Once it was discovered 
that Iran was quite fertile, the British came in and began drilling. The British believed 
they were being magnanimous when they gave Iran a seventeen percent share of the 
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profits, while they assumed the remaining eighty-three percent. For decades Iran went 
along with this with little protest. Around the time Mossadegh was elected, however, 
there was an outcry from Iranians who felt they were being unfairly exploited. 
Mossadegh utilized this discontent and made reclaiming Iranian oil the platform of his 
campaign. Encouraged by the oil agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia (which 
was not necessarily more equitable in terms of profits, but the US offered Saudi Arabia 
more concessions and security), as well as the American-Venezuelan agreement, in which 
profits were split 50/50, the Iranians requested a new contract be drawn up giving Iran a 
controlling share of their oil (Abrahamian, 2001). The British were taken off guard, 
believing that the Iranian population was complacent about British presence, and 
promptly refused. Mossadegh proceeded to nationalize Iran’s oil, which enraged the 
British government, who went to the United States for assistance.  
 It is at this point where scholarly works diverge on opinion. The uncertainty lies 
around the question: Why did the US get involved in Britain’s oil dispute? As I have 
mentioned, the first school of thought believes the US went along with the initial plans 
for a regime change because they feared Mossadegh was too progressive—essentially 
that he was a target for Soviet influence. This belief was reinforced by the support 
Mossadegh received from the communist Tudeh party toward the end of his tenure as 
prime minister. The other school of though, which I am inclined to agree with, asserts that 
the US ultimately decided that it was in its best interest to have such an abundant oil 
producer under control of a primary US ally, the British. As Ervand Abrahamian explains 
in his essay “The 1953 Coup in Iran” (2001): “If Iran had this power [to control its oil], it 
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could influence world prices and even choose to keep oil underground for future 
generations”. He goes on to explain:  
The security of the free world is dependent on large 
quantities of oil from the Middle East. If the attitude in Iran 
spreads to Saudi Arabia or Iraq, the whole structure may 
break down along with our ability to defend ourselves 
(Abrahamian, 2001). 
 
In short, if oil would provide Iran with leverage and autonomy, then the US was going to 
make certain that Britain maintained its control over Iranian oil. 
 Abrahamian also discusses the events leading up to the coup, along with its 
execution, in the context of the “secret history” of the CIA and British intelligence. Early 
on in his essay he discusses the shroud of secrecy surrounding America’s role in Iran, 
explaining that most historical accounts from the US State department have either been 
“sanitized”—altered to make culpability more difficult—or presumably removed from 
the archives. He is able to put pieces together through documents forwarded from British 
agents stationed in Iran to the British Foreign Office in the months leading to the coup. 
This essay is distinct from much of the other historic accounts of the coup because of 
Abrahamian’s access to the “sordid details” of the overall orchestration. Examples of this 
include a smear campaign against Mossadegh in which American and British officials 
hired Nazi and Muslim terrorist groups to claim Mossadegh as one of their own, and the 
use of assassinations to destabilize the government (Abrahamian, 2001). His use of brief 
memos and other correspondence between agencies offer the reader striking insight into 
Operation Ajax.  
 In examining the facts about the decision of Iran to nationalize its oil, an essay by 
Monsoor Moaddel of Eastern Michigan University, titled “State-Centered vs. Class-
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Centered perspectives on International Politics: The Case of the US and British 
Participation in the 1953 Coup against Premier Mossadeq in Iran” (1989), offers an in 
depth discussion of the impact this decision had on the future of Mossadegh and the 
constituency that ultimately—following the successful smear campaign—failed to 
support his policies when it was needed most. The fact that the article was written in 
1989 does not take away from the relevance of the author’s arguments. This is the case 
because, as an historical assessment of Iranian class relations during the 1950s, nothing 
has emerged that could dispute the author’s thesis. Furthermore, as an Iranian who lived 
through the coup and the ’79 revolution, this lends credibility to Moaddel’s view, as 
opposed to Western writers, or non-Iranian writers, who base much of their research on 
secondary sources. My decision to use Moaddel rests on the fact that it is difficult to 
uncover research that deals with inter-Iranian unrest as it relates to domestic policy. By 
and large, most of the research available looks at Iranian civil unrest as it relates to 
America’s role in the overthrow of Mossadegh, decades after the fact.  
 In his essay “Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue” (2008), author Fariborz 
Mokhtari further explicates class relations by exploring the factions that existed at the 
time—mainly modernists and traditionalists—that supported Mossadegh’s progressive 
vision of Iran. This aspect of Iran’s history is especially important as it looks at the role 
religion has played in Iran, before and after the coup and the Islamic Revolution. As the 
author explains, religion has always been an important part of Iranian civil society. 
Clerics (religious authorities) have always had a significant position, or status, both in 
society and in government. With the emergence of Mossadegh, an outspoken secularist, 
the role of the clerics was in danger of being marginalized in favor of a new 
 16 
constitutional democracy that gave the parliament more say on the legislative process. 
This is contrary to the previous system, under the shah (Son of Reza Shah; ruled 
intermittently from 1941-1979; briefly fled the country in 1953; was deposed in 1979), 
where the clerics had final say on all legislation that was passed. This is important 
because it shows how damaging America and Britain’s actions were toward the future of 
Iran: whereas under Mossadegh Iran was going down a legitimate path toward democracy 
(legitimate because it was supported by many Iranians), with the influence of the clerical 
class becoming marginalized; the overthrow of Mossadegh and the installation of the 
shah abruptly stopped Iran’s bid for democracy, but the state remained secular. However, 
the shah’s tenure was so detrimental to the growth of Iran, compounded with the 
knowledge that Western powers were responsible for the current government, that the 
resulting anti-American sentiment that burgeoned during this period created a platform 
for the clerics that eventually staged the 1979 revolution, and is still in charge to this day.  
 
Historical Background – Chapter Two (1960 – 1980) 
The second section of my thesis discusses the “Blowback”, or unintended consequences, 
of US interference in Iran. The term “Blowback”, according to Chalmers Johnson, author 
of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (2004), is a CIA term 
first used in March 1954 in a recently declassified report on the operation to overthrow 
Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran. Chalmers explains that it is a “metaphor for the 
unintended consequences of the US government's international activities that have been 
kept secret from the American people” (Johnson, 2004). Though repercussions of US 
activity in Iran would not surface for another three decades, the operation to overthrow 
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Mossadegh was so great that many CIA operatives feared there might ultimately be some 
form of blowback for its egregious interference in the affairs of Iran (Johnson, 2004).  
 Iran scholar Stephen Kinzer has written extensively about the coup, as well as the 
unintended consequences, and the policies of the current theocratic regime. In his book 
All the Shah's Men (2003) Kinzer discusses the changes that occurred in Iran's 
government, as well as the people, under the grand coordinator of the revolution, 
Ayatollah Khomeini. What Kinzer offers to the surplus of literature that exists regarding 
the 1979 revolution is a duel lens that illustrates the changes affecting Iranian civil 
society and foreign policy, and the realization in the US that this was becoming too 
unruly for simple shuttle democracy. Additionally, he writes extensively about how 
different US presidents—from Carter, Reagan and then Clinton—scrambled to find a 
place for Iran in each administration’s policies.  This section is particularly useful to my 
research, as I provide a brief profile of presidents Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush and 
Obama, and the doctrines they followed in dealing with Iran. 
 Also for this section I explore the origin of commonly used terms such as “rogue 
state”, “axis of evil”, “deviant regime” and “outlaw state”. The majority of literature for 
this topic comes from Alexandra Homolar's essay “Rebels Without a Conscious: The 
Evolution of the Rogue States in US Security Policy” (2010), along with Dr. Stephen 
Zunes’ essay for Middle East Policy, titled “The Function of Rogue States in US Middle 
East Policy” (1997). Zunes’ essay explores the criteria by which the international 
community—but specifically the United States—deems a country to be “rogue”. Along 
with Iran, Zunes charts how countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq and North Korean became 
involved in the rogue cluster. Further, Zunes discusses how US policymakers were able to 
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“take advantage of a widespread American prejudice” toward Islam in order to promote, 
or add credibility to, economic policies. He also examines the role of rogue states in US 
policy through a Cold War lens, asserting that “with the demise of the Soviet Union” the 
US was essentially looking for another “other” to place its attention. He quotes former 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake:  
Our policy of must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw 
states that not only choose to remain outside the family [of 
nations] but also assault its basic values…[and] exhibit a 
chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside 
world (Lake, 1994). 
 
 
 In my search for academic articles pertaining to the origin and function of the “rogue 
state”, I have found very little in terms of scholarly research that discusses how the US 
government, which has relied on the media as an agent of dissemination, began labeling 
uncooperative countries. This section is important in understanding the larger 
implications of US foreign policy toward Iran because it presents a clearer picture of the 
current US narrative and how it is shaped by political rhetoric in the upcoming 
Presidential election.  
Alexandra Homolar focuses on how post-Cold War defense policy came to be 
focused on “irrational”—but militarily inferior—adversaries. Case studies she cites 
include the North Korea nuclear crisis of 1993 and the Persian Gulf War of 1990.  
According to Homolar, the three criteria by which a state will be labeled as “rogue” is as 
follows: (a) rogue states violate international human rights norms; (b) the desire of these 
regimes to acquire weapons of mass destruction; and (c) government's state support of 
terrorism (Homolar, 2012). Although she does not include Iran as a case study, it is clear 
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that Iran fits these characterizations. Using her three criteria, I analyze how Iran fits into 
the discursively constructed narrative of a rogue state.  
 
Historical Background – Chapter Three 
On of the most important points I address in my research are the motives and rationale 
behind Iran’s bid for nuclear development—particularly Iran’s resolve to do so in the face 
of international reproach. This is a subject that gets little consideration, both in the media 
and the academic realm. The larger argument I make asserts that the United States must 
restore diplomatic channels with Iran. I demonstrate in my “Results” section how 
establishing formal relations will benefit both the United States and Iran. In defending 
this argument, it is of utmost importance to understand how, when, and why nuclear 
development became such an important part of the Iranian narrative. In order for the US 
and Iran to begin working towards formal talks—with negotiations and concessions being 
the goal—the US must understand and accept Iran’s reasons for pursuing nuclear 
technology. Only then will the cycle of intransigence and distrust be broken, and both 
nations can move towards a new era of progress. Briefly, I state that Iran’s reasons for 
pursuing nuclear development are as follows: (a) security and deterrence; (b) 
international prestige and status; (c) and what Rene Girard refers to as Mimetic Desire.  
 In his book From Violence to Blessing (2002), Vern Redekop discusses Rene 
Girard’s theory of Mimetic Desire, in which he states: “we form desires by imitating the 
desires of others” (Redekop, 2002) By framing this discussion with the theory of Mimetic 
Desire, I conduct a comparative of analysis of Iran and Israel’s nuclear programs, 
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respectively. The goal in this section is to show that, historically, Iran and Israel have 
similar reasons for wanting to go nuclear.  
Presently Israel is the only nuclear state in the Middle East region. In his essay 
“Israel’s Nuclear Weapons: The White House Factor” (2010), Dr. Jeremy Salt makes the 
claim that it was inevitable to expect one of Israel‘s neighbors to develop a deterrent of 
its own, arguing that “the states around Israel would never resign themselves to living 
forever in the shadow of Israel’s nuclear ‘deterrent’” (Salt, 2010). Salt presents what I 
find to be an unbiased assessment of Israel’s monopoly on nuclear arms, and how it has 
been a contributing factor to Iran’s perceived need for nuclear development. This 
suggests that Israel is what Redekop calls a Model, of which Iran has chosen to replicate. 
However, the focus of his essay is to tell the story of Israel’s nuclear plant in Dimona. 
The main factor behind Israel pursuing nuclear technology was their very creation out of 
Palestine, which placed it in a dangerous neighborhood consisting of Arab states. In 
response to this perceived insecurity, Israel signed into a nuclear-cooperation agreement 
with the US in 1955 under President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program. Shortly 
thereafter Israel began construction on a small “experimental” reactor at Nahal Soreq 
(Salt, 2010). In a public statement Israel claimed it was developing nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. Through Salt’s analysis, it becomes clear that initially Israel had the 
support of the US. However, as the Cold War began to take precedence, US policy began 
to shift toward strict nonproliferation: 
Henry Owen, chairman of the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Council…outlined the dangers of an Israeli 
nuclear-weapons capability: other countries would be more 
likely to develop nuclear weapons and less likely to sign 
the NPT, while Arab frustrations in the region would 
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increase, and US influence would suffer a major setback 
(Salt, 2012).  
 
Despite America’s disapproval, Israel continued to surreptitiously develop nuclear 
technology. Salt concludes that the US and Israel entered into what he refers to as a 
“semi-formalized charade”, in which Israel developed arms over the course of ten years, 
while the United States looked the other way. The US did, however, stipulate that Israel 
must keep its nuclear program opaque.  
 In Gawdat Bahgat’s essay “Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran” 
(2006), he explores the idea that nuclear development for Iran represents a point of pride, 
or what he refers to as “collective image”. The factors that support the collective image 
concept are as follows: (a) Iran is larger and more populated than most of its neighbors; 
(b) unlike most of its neighbors, Iranian nationalism and the traditions of the nation-state 
have been in place for a long time; and (c) the Iranian’s throughout history have 
perceived themselves as victims of foreign powers’ expansion and manipulation (Bahgat, 
2006). Essentially, Iran believes that without foreign powers’ intervention—that being 
Russia, Britain and the US—Iran would have “established and maintained its status as a 
prominent and regional and global power” (Bahgat, 2006). Especially since the 
revolution, large swathes of Iranians respond to a powerful national myth that Iran was 
prematurely cut down in terms of growth and international participation, and nuclear 
development can perhaps “restore Iran to its rightful place as a Great Power” (Bahgat, 
2006).   
 In examining Iran’s reasons for pursuing nuclear technology, one of the most 
compelling factors is security and deterrence. Looking at the timeline provided, one can 
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see that Iran has historically been victim to occupation, pillaging, behind-the-scenes 
manipulation of its government, and isolation in the face of a ruthless enemy. It is fair to 
say Iran, like Israel, is an insecure country. But of all the wrongs done to Iran, perhaps the 
most damning was the role of the international community during the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988). After the Islamic Revolution, Iran experienced a power vacuum that was at 
once filled by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. However, as quick as Khomeini 
was in coming to power, the dramatic transition left Iran in a vulnerable state. Joost 
Hiltermann explains in his essay “Deep Traumas, Fresh Ambitions: Legacies of the Iran-
Iraq War” (2010) how the vacuum created by the fall of the shah allowed Saddam 
Hussein the opportunity to neutralize a threat to the Iraqi Ba’athist movement: the Shi’a 
majority in Iran. Moreover, initially at a loss by the revolution that removed the US from 
Iran in 1979, the US also saw an opportunity to weaken and contain Iran. With discreet 
assistance and encouragement from the US, Iraq launched a ruthless attack on Iran: 
The war proved both traumatic and unifying. Iran felt it 
was caught unawares at a moment of internal havoc. Iraq’s 
air and missile strikes on its cities, oil infrastructure and 
shipping, combined with its chemical weapons use, 
crippled the economy and eroded public morale 
(Hiltermann, 2010).  
  
Hiltermann claims Iran’s worst enemy was itself. The purpose of the 1979 
revolution was to remove foreign powers from Iran, which was achieved. Yet the 
isolation induced by the revolution and the 1980 US embassy hostage crisis “left Iran 
bereft of allies even matters of great international concern…such as Iraq’s targeting of 
civilians and its gas warfare” (Hiltermann, 2010).  
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Chapter four - Results & Recommendations for Rapprochement  
In discussing US-Iran relations since 1979, in which all formal channels of diplomacy 
had been severed, scholar Richard Maher explores sustainable strategies of relations 
between Iran and the US. Like myself, Maher believes it is in America’s interests to 
restore formal channels of diplomacy with Iran. In his essay “Informal Diplomatic 
Relations between the United States and Iran: A Sustainable Strategy?” (2008), he argues 
that America's hardline approach toward Iran will be ultimately detrimental to the greater 
Middle East. Moreover, the US will be hit the hardest if turmoil overwhelms the region as 
America’s precarious economy would be rocked by an inevitable increase in gas prices. 
Iran has maintained a veneer of infallibility with respect to the waves of sanctions and 
embargoes that the US, UN and EU have placed on Iran. The most salient point I have 
taken away from his essay is the discussion of the different forms of “informal” 
diplomatic relations have taken place since 1979, and how efficient these have been in 
terms of achieving US strategic aims vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear development.  
A key question of this section asks: Has Iran’s pursuit of nuclear development 
created an imperative to consider a future where diplomatic and economic coercion is 
exhausted, and no options remain other than military action? A more urgent question 
asks: Would military action against Iran result in a wider regional war? And finally: What 
does the US expect to gain from a possible attack? Many strategists and scholars have 
offered speculations to the latter that range from access to Iran’s vast oil reserves, to a 
regime change that would allow the US to contain Iran. If this were the case, the results 
would be dubious. In 2003 the US invaded Iraq and installed the Karzai government—but 
only after nearly a decade of war and trillions of dollars and hundreds of lives. Only this 
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year has the US finally managed to extricate itself. In an article by Lieutenant Colonel 
Leif Eckholm of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Pentagon, titled 
“Invading Iran: Lessons from Iraq” (2010), he asserts that with many similarities Iraq and 
Iran share, the one major difference is that, unlike the Saddam Hussein government, the 
current regime in Iran has not only consolidated its power by running the legislature as an 
extension of clerical councils (mullahs) who “collectively rule above the fray of electoral 
politics”, but have also “consistently exploited the anti-American sentiment that remains 
a dominant narrative with most Iranians”. What this means for the US, Eckholm 
portentously states, is “invading forces would need to be prepared for a deeply embedded 
enduring insurgency” (Eckholm, 2009).  
 To further understand what containment of Iran would mean, authors Dalia Kaye 
and Eric Lorber discuss this topic in their essay “Containing Iran: What Does It Mean?” 
(2011). This article is particularly important to my research because of the way in which 
Kaye and Lorber frame their argument: they assert that trying to contain Iran would have 
a variety of negative consequences. A large part of their work focuses on how effective 
containment was when applied to the Soviet Union. Yet they are quick to point out that 
the nature that enemy is different than the problems Iran poses. Their primary concern 
with trying to contain Iran is that “policymakers relying on containment as a foreign 
policy strategy do not properly understand its requirements and limits” and therefore 
“risk unduly circumscribing alternatives or applying it appropriately” (Kaye & Lorber, 
2012). This brings up a point that I address in my thesis: why have policymakers insisted 
on pursuing the same policies meant to contain and isolate Iran when there has been no 
improvement in Iran’s status as a rogue state? 
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 In the article “The United States, Iran and the Middle East’s New 'Cold War'” 
(2010), authors Flynt and Hillary Leverett discuss relations between the US and Iran in a 
strategic context, arguing that relations need to be “analyzed and understood…in terms of 
their bilateral dynamics” (Leverett & Leverett, 2010). The authors describe how the 
international community is divided between states and are willing to work within the 
framework of US hegemony, such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; while on 
the other side of this divide are “Middle Eastern states and non-state actors that are 
unwilling to legitimize American (and…Israeli) hegemony over the region” (Leverett & 
Leverett, 2010). Though their essay covers a wide range of topics, essentially the authors 
support my central argument for establishing bilateral relations: 
We argue that the United States and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran should transcend the prospects for hegemonial war or 
strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of 
their relations, in a manner similar to the realignment in 
relations between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China during Richard Nixon’s tenure in the 
White House (Leverett & Leverett, 2010).  
 
In three sections, the authors outline recommendations for the US to implement a 
realignment of diplomatic measures toward Iran. However, what has benefited my 
particular research interest is that the author’s labors to achieve this while considering the 
perspective of Iranian interests. Important theorists I utilize in conducting my research on 
the section “Prospects for Rapprochement” include Hillary and Flynt Leverett, and 
Richard Maher. Whereas Maher lays out the options available to the United States that 
will bring it closer to establishing warmer relations with Iran, The Leverett’s have been 
outspoken in their position, which I share, that the diplomatic measures taken toward Iran 
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since the 1980s have not been effective; further, these measures have in effect solidified 
the protracted nature of the conflict: 
To achieve [rapprochement], Washington needs to pursue a 
genuinely comprehensive and strategic approach to 
diplomacy with Iran. Such an approach would be grounded 
in the reaffirmation of America’s commitment in the Algiers 
accord not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs and in the 
prospect of a US guarantee not to use force to change the 
borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic 
(Leverett & Leverett, 2010).   
 
However, in order to establish a sound argument supporting the need for rapprochement, 
there needs to be an in-depth exposition of the potential costs and consequences of such a 
decision— of which there is no shortage of opinions. The difficulty in gathering data has 
been in handpicking authors who hold high statuses in the defense community. 
Additionally, in attempting to present a comprehensive discourse analysis, the inclusion 
of authors whose position on the “Nuclear Iran Question” I argue against is paramount in 
creating an inclusive or “four-sided” discourse.    
Perhaps one of the biggest proponents of launching a direct strike on Iran is 
Mathew Kroenig. A Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations 
and a professor of politics at Georgetown University, Kroenig wrote a recent article, 
succinctly titled “Time to Attack Iran” (January/February 2012) for Foreign Affairs. In 
his article, Kroenig offers information and opinions about a potential attack on Iran for its 
nuclear development program, such as the issues of cost, military strategy, risks for 
civilians, and global security associated with a US attack (Kroenig, 2012). Kroenig’s 
central argument states, “The only thing worse than military action against Iran would be 
an Iran armed with nuclear weapons”. Therefore he argues that a military strike, if 
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managed carefully, could “spare the region and the world a very real threat and 
dramatically improve the long-term national security of the United States” (Kroenig, 
2012). However, Kroenig does not pretend that the risks associated with such a strike 
would not be significant. He also discusses the dangers involved with conducting a strike 
on Iranian oil facilities: 
Even if the United States managed to identify all of Iran’s 
nuclear plants, however, actually destroying them could 
prove to be enormously difficult…[as] Iran’s nuclear plants 
are dispersed across the country, buried deep underground 
and hardened against attack, and ringed with air defenses, 
making a raid complex and dangerous. In addition…Iran has 
purposefully placed its facilities near civilian populations, 
which would almost certainly come under fire in a US raid, 
potentially leading to hundreds, if not thousands, of deaths 
(Kroenig, 2012).  
 
In outlining such risk to the civilian population, Kroenig defends his position by claiming 
the US could mitigate the risks by using precision-guided missiles to pinpoint specific 
centrifuge-manufacturing sites “while leaving their surroundings unscathed”. Moreover, 
the US can reduce the collateral damage even further by “striking at night or simply 
leaving those less important plants off its target lists” (Kroenig, 2012).  
 In direct response to Kroenig’s article, Colin Kahl, a Senior Fellow at the Center 
for a New American Security, and also a professor in the Security Studies Program at 
Georgetown, published an article in Foreign Affairs titled “Not Time to Attack Iran” 
(March/April 2012). Responding to Kroenig’s assertion that the consequences of 
conducting a “surgical strike” targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities would not outweigh the 
prospects of a nuclear-armed Iran, Kahl states that Kroenig is making the same mistake as 
those who advocated for invading Iraq: One of the key lessons that should come out of 
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Iraq, as America’s last preventive war, is that “Washington should not choose war when 
there are still other options”. Furthermore, the United States should not “base its decision 
to attack on best-case analyses of how it hopes the conflict will turn out” (Kahl, 2012).  
What I find particularly striking about Kahl’s article is the statement he makes 
regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity, in which he asserts “there is no hard 
evidence that Supreme Leader Khomeini has yet made the final decision to develop 
[nuclear weapons]”. This distinction is quite important as a US preventive attack on Iran, 
without properly establishing an intention to develop WMD’s, would be both a war crime 
and a violation against US law. As Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman explains, “Since 
the US is a signatory of the UN Charter—a treaty ratified by the Senate—its provisions 
banning aggressive wars have become, under Article of the Constitution, an integral part 
of US law”. Ackerman goes on to cite Israel’s bombing of the Osirik nuclear reactor in 
Iraq in 1981. In this case, he points out, the US voted for a unanimous UN Security 
Council Resolution condemning the attack. He quotes Margaret Thatcher, who was then 
Britain’s prime minister, as saying, “Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be 
justified. It represents a grave breach of international law” (Ackerman, 2012).   
 I further utilize Dr. Kahl’s campaign to prevent the US from going to war with 
Iran by drawing from one of several testimonies delivered before the US House of 
Representatives. In one testimony from March 21, 2012, titled Iran, Hezbollah, and the 
Threat to the Homeland, Kahl states that, indeed, Iran’s nuclear ambitions represent one 
of the greatest threats to US national security. Kahl revisits President Obama’s record 
regarding his policy toward Iran, highlighting that Obama has established that: (a) The 
Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable; (b) All options—including military force—
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remain on the table; (c) The administration does not endorse a policy of containing a 
nuclear-armed Iran. His thesis, however, maintains that military action should continue to 
be a last resort— “and it should not be used until all non-military avenues have been 
exhausted” (Kahl, 2012). Kahl argues that it would be both strategically unwise, but also 
setting a bad precedent, to stage an attack on Iran when the “threat from their nuclear 
program is growing, but not yet imminent”. Moreover, contrary to Kroenig’s pro-strike 
position, Kahl argues that the costs of military action are very high, “both in terms of the 
escalatory potential”, as well as its “regional and global effects”.  The examples he uses 
illustrates how spillover will undoubtedly be difficult to manage on all sides; namely that 
Iran may retaliate with missile strikes against US bases in the Gulf, activate proxy and 
terrorist attacks against US diplomatic facilities in Iraq and elsewhere, as well as 
harassment of international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz (Kahl, 2012).  
The final section of my thesis draws on recommendations from researchers from 
various think tanks in the United States and Britain, primarily being the Center for New 
American Security, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the Oxford 
Research Group. In a proposal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy titled 
Engaging Iran: Lessons from the Past (2009), author Patrick Clawson advocates for the 
US to engage Iran in “productive diplomatic talks” based on “clear understanding of the 
geopolitical context and of the best procedures to use” (Clawson, 2009). His thesis rests 
on the fact that the United States presently—and historically, I am inclined to add—lacks 
“understanding of the complexities of Iranian society and the dynamics of the Iranian 
leadership”. In the effort to pursue negotiations with Iran, the US must improve their 
understanding of the reasoning behind the Iranian regime’s bid for nuclear development: 
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“These steps would facilitate and indeed expedite political and economic reform in Iran” 
(Clawson, 2009). The Center for New American Security also makes several 
recommendations for policymakers in cultivating a foundation of mutual understanding 
and a willingness to make equal concessions, in order to ensure the functionality of 
negotiations. Though the CNAS maintains the position that a nuclear-armed Iran “poses a 
significant threat to Israel’s security and increases the prospects for regional conflict”, it 
disputes the claim that diplomacy has been exhausted. The priority of US policymakers, 
therefore, should be to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, “rather than 
adopting a policy of nuclear deterrence and containment” (Kahl, 2012).  
 
Significance to Existing Literature 
In my research I have come upon numerous books and scholarly articles that discuss the 
role of the US in the current atmosphere of tension with Iran and Israel. There is also an 
abundance of literature related to the overthrow of Mossadegh, as well as how the Islamic 
Revolution transformed the relationship between Iran and the US. As for contemporary 
issues, including nuclear proliferation, US-Iran relations and Iran-Israel relations, 
journals such as International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy 
provide extensive articles on the “Nuclear Iran Question”. Various think tanks, such as 
the Center for New American Security, the Oxford Research Group, and the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, offer several relevant proposals that support my central 
argument, which is that the Obama administration should continue to pursue diplomacy, 
as well as the steps by which successful diplomacy can be utilized in order to result in 
positive negotiations for both the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
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 However, there is a surprising lack of literature that provides an in-depth analysis 
of factors that have caused the relationship between the US and Iran to developed into 
what it is today. Though there are numerous works that touch on each of the 
aforementioned headings, there is little available that adequately discusses each heading 
as it relates to the current standoff among the US, Israel and Iran. What I am to provide in 
this study is a timely assessment of the US-Iran conflict, comprising a thorough analysis 
of events that have been instrumental in shaping US-Iran relations, and demonstrating 
how using a historical lens is important in understanding the situation that will be 
unfolding in the coming months. 
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Methodology 
As a great deal of my research discusses the historic events that have lead to what 
I refer to as the state of “dual intransigence” that exists between Iran and the United 
States—and has existed for the last thirty years—I gathered qualitative data in the form of 
secondary research. In the first section, the question I seek to answer is: What is the 
origin of the atmosphere of mutual distrust between the US and Iran? In answering this 
question I focused on several notable scholars’ accounts of key events, such as the 
overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the Islamic Revolution, the US embassy crisis, and 
the Iran-Iraq War. Specifically I searched for existing research pulled from archival 
documents, such as State Department memos between intelligence agencies. Using this 
historical lens is important to the overall goal of my research, as it shows how the 
motives of the defense community developed from the Cold War era. This supports my 
argument that the defense apparatus was designed initially to deal with the communist 
threat; and instead of gradually changing after the fall of the Soviet Union, the apparatus 
has remained largely intact, though it has proven to be unsuited to the new other: 
“unstable” Third World regimes.  
 For section two I also analyze scholarly works for specific details regarding the 
domestic unrest in Iran as a result of the shah returning to power. I pay close attention to 
academic books and articles in order to ascertain information on the affects the Iran-Iraq 
War had on the Iranian narrative. Since my goal for this section is to show how the US 
took the instability in both Iran and Iraq as an opportunity to contain both countries, I 
determine that the best way to research this subject is to conduct an analysis of academic 
articles, newspapers and government documents. To do this I analyze newspaper articles 
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that were released almost a decade after the war.  These articles come from such 
reputable publications as the Washington Post and the New York Times. The journalists 
who produced the stories acquired their information from leaked government documents 
that provided details related to the role of the United States in the war.  
 Section three is a comparative analysis of Iran and Israel’s respective nuclear 
programs. This requires historical data, which I obtain from various academic articles. 
My goal is to find parallels between both countries perceived need for nuclear 
technology.  Additionally, I research the State Department intelligence archive in order to 
examine the language used when different government officials—such as IAEA monitors, 
diplomats, as well as the President of the United States—discussed Israel’s nuclear 
program through memos and documents. The primary question for this section asks, 
“Why has nuclear development become so embedded in the Iranian narrative?” To frame 
my study, I establish three criteria: Deterrence, prestige, and what Rene Girard calls 
Mimetic Desire. At its most basic level, Mimetic Desire—for my purposes it will be in 
the context of competing states—means the act of copying or replicating actions and 
goals of a “Model” in order to achieve the same status.  In examining academic articles, 
scholarly books, and government documents, I establish that both Israel and Iran fit each 
criterion.  
 For the “Results” section, the central questions are: Is warfare the best approach to 
dealing with a nuclear Iran? What would the consequences be of a strike on Iranian 
nuclear facilities? And, How can the US avoid a collision course with Iran? In answering 
these questions, I conduct a discourse analysis of some of the prominent actors debating 
the “Nuclear Iran Question”. This includes some of the Republican candidates vying for 
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office during the election (which Barack Obama has since won), as well as policymakers 
and scholars from some of the top institutions. Significant to this discussion is an up-to-
date overview of rhetoric that has been used in the year leading up to the election. Since 
Israel plays a large role in advocating for a strike on Iran, I analyze recent statements 
made by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, President Shimon Peres, and Defense 
Minister Ehud Barak. I also examine the rhetoric of Governor Mitt Romney, who labored 
towards the last few months of the election to galvanize his Jewish constituency.  
In order to understand the consequences of a strike on Iran, I consult various 
proposals, studies and testimonies written by some of the leading think tanks that 
influence US foreign policy, such as the Center for New American Security, and the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. However, my goal in this section is to present 
both sides of the argument: Those who share my belief that the US and Israel should not 
attack Iran; those who are proponents of launching a military strike; and those who 
advocate for nuclear proliferation as a natural deterrent.  
One potential limitation of this study is that the US-Iran conflict appears to be 
currently reaching a dubious new phase: Israel is pressuring the US to sanction a 
preemptive attack, a position which many hardliners in the US share. President Obama 
has just been reelected, so it will be difficult to make projections as to what his plans are 
in dealing with Iran. However, the goal of this study has not been to try to find a solution 
to the US-Iran conflict. Rather, my goal from the outset is to provide a comprehensive, 
thorough analysis of Iran’s evolution as a monarchy, to a democracy, to a theocracy—and 
all the while demonstrating: (1) The role of Western powers in Iran’s development; (2) 
The backlash against foreign intervention, which resulted in the severance of formal 
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relations; (3) How nuclear development became an important part of the Iranian 
narrative; (4) and finally, that an overhaul of diplomatic measures is required for any 
progress to be made.
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Chapter One: 
Enter the United States  
(1940-1960) 
 
“America has not dictated to other nations; we have freed other 
nations from dictators”.  
 
 -Mitt Romney.   
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Iran has a rich cultural history that dates back to before the 15th century.  It is a history 
rife with territorial dispute, resource conflict, religious fundamentalism, and revolution.  
Dwight D. Eisenhower once said that certain aspects of Iran’s modern history come right 
out of a dime-store spy novel.  Regardless of Iran’s long history, it has been the victim of 
colonialists that used its oil-rich land for personal gain, at the expense of Iran’s political, 
social and economic development.  In this section of my thesis, I argue that the current 
state of Iran—its ultra-religious government, inchoate economy and struggling 
democracy—is a direct result of British and especially US intervention. I pay special 
attention to the 1953 coup d’état orchestrated by the CIA, and how this seminal event 
forever changed the political landscape of Iran, as well as its relation to the West.  
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Enter the United States 
At the outset of WWI Iran declared itself neutral. But Iran was still under control of 
Russia and Britain, both of which had committed to a treaty that gave Britain more 
territory, including the oil-rich south.  Additionally, Iran's hopes of remaining neutral 
were further dashed by the fact that it was “strategically located...and four powers used it 
as a battlefield”. The war had a devastating result, leaving much of Iran's farmland in 
ruins. This led many to desire for a “strong and independent government” (Keddie, 
1981). But the control of the British quelled this movement.  They consolidated more 
power, until, in 1918, the British devised a new government for Iran that was 
constitutionally subservient to Britain, handpicking key political figures.  Furthermore, 
the Anglo-Persian Treaty was drawn but not yet ratified in 1919, which stated that the 
British would place advisors in Iran's government, a larger British army would be 
assembled, and transportation would be established.  Nationalists resisted the treaty, but 
were powerless to stop British control. The end of WWII established the US as a 
hegemonic power.  The US expressed an interest in aiding Iran, with an eye on its vast oil 
reserves.  The State Department issued a statement that criticized Britain’s control over 
Iran: 
The Department has taken the position that the 
monopolization of the production of an essential raw 
material, such as petroleum, by means of exclusive 
concessions or other arrangements is in effect contrary to 
the principle of equal treatment of the nationals of all 
foreign countries (Keddie, 1981). 
 
 With the sudden intervention of the US, the British began rethinking the treaty, 
and started to seriously rethink their control over Iran.  By 1921, Britain drew away from 
their treaty, but still kept a prominent presence in Iran.  It wasn't until WWII that the US 
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began to have a real interest in Iran.  In 1942, Iran asked the US to help fix their financial 
situation.  The US sent Dr. A.C. Millspaugh, an economist, to remedy the situation.  He 
was unable to make much of a difference, as he described Iran's industry as being 
“corrupt and inefficient” (Keddie, 1981: 115).  Over time, this led to the emergence of 
oppositional organizations and protests.  An example of this is the Tudeh Party, which 
was the official communist party of Iran, who were gaining popularity at this time.  
 
Mohammad Mossadegh  
Mossadegh was a member of the Majlis, a fervent nationalist who supported progressive 
reform.  Mossadegh's motives were shaped by the belief that “Iranians must rule 
themselves and not submit to the will of foreigners”.  Mossadegh studied in France at l' 
Ecole de Sciences Politiques, where he developed various illnesses that would stay with 
him for the rest of his life. Due to his illness Mossadegh was forced to resettle in 
Switzerland, where he earned a doctorate of law—the first Iranian to do so at a European 
university.  As a member of the Majlis, he was not afraid to proclaim that he thought Iran 
was not reaching its potential.  He went so far as to call other members traitors and 
unpatriotic for not trying to unburden Iran from foreign control (Kinzer, 2003).  
 Even before he would go on to become prime minister, when he was the director 
of National Front—a coalition of political parties, trade unions, civil groups and “other 
organizations dedicated to strengthening democracy and limiting the power of foreigners 
in Iran”—Mossadegh was not liked by the two major occupying powers (Kinzer, 2003).  
Britain disliked Mossadegh because of his staunch anti-foreigner view, which prevented 
them from getting the Supplemental Oil Agreement passed.  This agreement would have 
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retroactively altered the concession the British had with Iranian oil primarily by allowing 
the British to receive higher royalty payments.  Mossadegh and the National Front 
opposed this agreement on the grounds that it did not “give Iran a greater voice in the 
management of the company” (Kinzer, 2003).  In response to the agreement, the Majlis 
created an eighteen-member committee to officially review the Supplemental Agreement.  
This upset the British, who immediately sent word to the shah that this must be 
suppressed.  Though the shah acquiesced to the British, he was unsuccessful at stopping 
the committee.  As Mossadegh was named head of the committee, he promptly put the 
item under review and, as everyone expected, denied the agreement: 
Mossadegh did not care about dollars and cents or number 
of barrels per day. He saw the basic issue as one of national 
sovereignty...[which was] being undercut by a company that 
sacrificed Iranian lives for British interest. This is what 
infuriated him about the government's willingness to 
compromise—and it was what made him decide 
unequivocally that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had to 
go (Kinzer, 2003).   
 
 Aside from his fiercely anti-foreigner stance, Mossadegh renounced the 
agreement in light of an agreement made at this time between the Arabian-American Oil 
Company (Aramco), which would divide all profits between the US and Saudi Arabia 
down the middle.  As word of this agreement spread, nationalists began to grow angrier 
with the British, who they saw as a “corrupt ruling class”.  One employee of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company (APOC) wrote a letter to a member of the company's board of 
directors, Edward Elkington, saying the company needed to “recognize the awaking 
nationalism and political consciousness of the people of Iran” and show “tolerance for 
other people's views” (Kinzer, 2003).  The people of Iran, meanwhile, called for 
nationalization of their oil. Mossadegh himself considered this, but ultimately thought it 
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farfetched; he decided to deal with the situation one step at a time.  If they could remove 
the agreement from the table, they would begin to think about subsequent steps.  
Knowing in advance how Britain would react, the committee added only one stipulation 
to the agreement: that the profit be split 50/50.  Of course the answer was no, and when 
the Majlis sat down to vote they ended up voting to nationalize Iran's oil.  
 The British, now under a new conservative government headed by Winston 
Churchill, were not going to capitulate without a fight.  They ordered Reza Shah to 
dissolve the Majlis.  They also ordered him to hire a British-appointed official as prime 
minister.  Additionally, the British appealed to the United States, urging President Truman 
to basically not speak out against their point of view (Kinzer, 2003).  Finally, Britain 
rallied for worldwide support to boycott on Iranian oil.  The plight of the British 
notwithstanding, the US did care if Iran nationalized its oil.  In a show of support of the 
boycott, the US sent a letter to the American ambassador in Italy, which was showing 
interest in purchasing Iranian oil.  The letter was a warning that British and American oil 
companies would “most likely resent it strongly, and remember it”.  Moreover, the letter 
also mentioned America's aid toward restoration in Italy after WWII, stating that the 
“American people...might regard this as ungracious” (Kiddie, 1981).  Despite the 
pressure applied by the US and Britain, Mossadegh was gaining in popularity.  On April 
28, 1951, he was voted in as prime minister of Iran.  Mossadegh told the Majlis that he 
would accept the position of prime minister on the condition that they pass an act he had 
written up, which stipulated that a “parliamentary committee would audit Anglo-Iranian's 
books, weigh the claims of both sides for compensation, and begin sending Iranians 
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abroad to learn the skills to run an oil company” (Kinzer, 2003).  This was an unexpected 
turn of events that angered the shah and took the British by surprise.  
 
Fear of Encirclement 
The year 1950 was the peak of the Cold War.  The US was engaged in the Korean War, 
fighting what the American government, as well as its people, saw as a “relentless 
communist advance”.  To the American consciousness communism was spreading at an 
alarming rate: 
Soviet power already had Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. 
Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and 
Romania, Hungary and Poland...In 1949 the Soviet Union 
successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-
Western forces in China lost their civil war to 
communists...From Washington it seemed that enemies were 
on the march everywhere (Kinzer, 2003).  
 
Despite a meeting that took place at Potsdam two months after the end of WWII, 
in which leaders pledged allegiance to pro-democratic forces, the US was still not 
convinced.  In response to a growing sense of insecurity, President Truman approved the 
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency.  Its mandate, which would broaden greatly in 
the next five years, was to “carry out functions and duties related to intelligence affecting 
national security”.  Moreover, the National Security Council drafted a document called 
NSC-68 that “asserted the need for the US to confront communist movements not only in 
regions of vital security interest, but wherever they appeared” (Kinzer, 2003).  
 America's worst fear was the consolidation of communist forces.  They felt that if 
enough of Europe and Asia turned to communism, they would naturally bound together 
and turn against the US.  In response to this fear, the US made plans to implement NSC-
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68—to launch a preemptive strike against any country with even the slightest leanings 
toward communism. 
 
Planning a Coup  
Still resisting the nationalization of Iranian oil, the British considered invading Iran.  The 
US warned against this, urging that the Iranians could conceivably turn to the Soviets for 
help. This  
concern was legitimized by the success of the communist Tudeh party under Mossadegh.  
Britain subsequently implemented a plan to cripple Iran's economy by boycotting their 
oil.  The first step taken to carry this out was to sabotage the National Iranian Oil 
Company's refinery in Abadan.  In doing so, Iran was forced to advertise in Europe for 
specialists who could lend much-needed assistance.  British diplomats, however, made 
sure that no specialists made it to Abadan.  Additionally, they persuaded Sweden, France 
and Germany would go along with this by denying visas to interested applicants (Kinzer, 
2003).   
 The efforts of the British were effective.  Iran's economy was suffering hugely by 
the boycott and unemployment went up.  Mossadegh's popularity held, but his hero status 
was waning.  As a final measure, Britain tried to get Mossadegh removed from power by 
paying off members of the Majlis.  The plan of the British was to “fill the Majlis with 
deputies who would vote to depose Mossadegh...it would be a coup carried out by legal 
means” (Kinzer, 2003). However, this did not work in Britain's favor.  They again 
suggested invading Iran, or even staging a “proper” coup against Mossadegh to the US, 
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but Truman was still staunchly opposed to taking such measures, and the British were not 
willing to carry it out without the US.  
 
Operation Ajax 
When Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president of the United States, Britain had a 
renewed sense of optimism for their plans for Iran.  Whereas Truman was afraid how his 
participation in the overthrow of Mossadegh would reflect on his administration — as the 
plans were drawn up toward the end of his term — Britain felt that they could convince 
Eisenhower to see things their way.  Furthermore, Eisenhower's election campaign was 
very conservative and fiercely anti-communist.  The ensuing coup staged against 
Mossadegh was originated by British Intelligence, but was finalized and eventually 
carried out by the CIA.  A British spy named C.M. Woodhouse was an agent who had 
been removed from Iran under Mossadegh.  Because he had been involved with the 
conflict since the Supplemental Agreement Plan, he was one of the few who knew how 
desperately Britain wanted control of Iranian oil.  But the British plight was unimportant 
to him.  The American view was far more pressing.  Woodhouse agreed that the more 
salient threat implicit in the continuing conflict was possible Soviet influence. In a 
statement written to Eisenhower and his CIA counterparts, Woodhouse said: 
...even if a settlement of the oil dispute could be negotiated 
with Mossadegh, which was doubtful, he was still incapable 
of resisting a coup by the Tudeh party, if it were backed by 
Soviet support. Therefore, he must be removed (Kinzer, 
2003).  
 
Eisenhower agreed with this view.  The plan drawn up by both government's intelligence 
— called Operation Ajax — entailed manipulating public opinion toward Mossadegh and 
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turning as many Iranians as possible against him: 1) paying off thugs to stage attacks on 
religious leaders and make it seem like they were ordered by Mossadegh; 2) meanwhile, 
military officers and politicians were bribed to be ready for whatever action was needed 
after the coup; 3) on the day of the coup, thousands of paid demonstrators would stage a 
massive antigovernment rally.  The Majlis would subsequently respond with a “quasi-
legal” vote to dismiss Mossadegh; and Mohammad Reza Shah would be restored as the 
State's monarch (Kinzer, 2003).  
 As it happens, the coup was disastrous.  Because so many people were involved, 
and the elapsed time between confirming the key principles and execution was so long, 
Mossadegh became aware of the coup and was able to foil the plan.  However, losing the 
element of surprise was only a minor setback.  They staged another much less graceful 
coup a few days later, which included bringing the Iranian army to Mossadegh's home 
and literally chasing him away.  He was found several days later and brought before a 
military tribunal where he was charged with “inciting the people to armed insurrection”.  
Of course this was not true.  Nevertheless Mossadegh was sentenced to three years in 
prison and house arrest for life.  In his appeal Mossadegh stated: “My only crime is that I 
nationalized the Iranian oil industry and removed from this land the network of 
colonialism and the political and economic influences of the greatest empire on earth” 
(Kinzer, 2003).  
 As planned, Reza Shah returned as monarch of Iran.  The agent who is known as 
being primarily responsible for the success of Operation Ajax was named Kermit 
Roosevelt, the grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt.  He went to visit the 
shah afterward, and the shah poured two glasses of vodka, proclaiming: “I owe my throne 
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to God, my people, my army—and to you” (Kinzer, 2003).  The Americans were pleased 
with their good work.  But what they didn't know was that the power they handed to Reza 
Shah would create huge social and economic problems for Iran — and later for the US. 
What mattered to the US was that the perceived threat of a communist takeover in Iran 
was quelled.  
 
New Man in Charge 
There were many things that changed as a result of Reza Shah's restoration.  General 
Ardeshir Zahedi, the man who complied with the US and replaced Mossadegh as prime 
minister, was forced to resign from office.  The shah consolidated his power, with the 
hopes of creating a dictatorial regime.  He pursued this course with full support of the 
US, who gave him $1 billion in the decade following the coup (Kinzer, 2003).  Moreover, 
the shah ran Iran under a secular administration.  This further consolidated his power, as 
it meant the ulema clerical class had lost any influence it was granted during the drafting 
of the constitution.  Under his rule, the ulema “gradually lost all their seats in the Majlis” 
as well as “control of the educational and judicial institutions” (Moaddel, 1993). Any 
Iranians who had hopes for a continuing democracy in Iran were sorely disappointed.  
The shah secured his grip on every sector of Iran, stifling any sort of dissent and making 
deals with foreign companies that made him richer, without any significant benefit to the 
Iranian economy.  The US and Britain did not step in or criticize the shah's regime 
because “American and British companies, Western governments and corporations felt 
safer with a centralized government under a pro-Western ruler” (Kiddie, 1981).  
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 According to Monsoor Moaddel, “a combination of effective state repression, the 
growth of a radical faction among the ulema, and tactical errors, and disorganization” of 
secular political groups allowed for a mass conversion to Islam as an “alternative 
revolutionary ideology to both communism and national-liberalism” (Moaddel, 1993).   
As conditions worsened the shah's reforms meant to modernize Iran became increasingly 
unpopular by the people, as well as the ulema.  Rather, people began to turn to Islam as a 
way to resolve Iran's problems.  A movement began to emerge that espoused Islamic 
discourse and the overthrow of the shah.  The main proponent of this movement was 
Ayatollah Khomeini, a shrewd and respected cleric.  Khomeini called for an 
establishment of an Islamic government that would be under the control of a supreme 
religious leader:  
It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an 
end to this system of oppression and, for the sake of the 
well being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to 
overthrow these oppressive governments and form an 
Islamic government (Moaddel, 1993).  
 
 The subsequent Islamic Revolution, which emerged victorious on February 11, 
1979, gave Khomeini free reign to expand the discursive field of revolutionary Islam. The 
early reforms he implemented included justifying the ulema's direct rule in society. This 
meant reconstituting the government in favor of the clerics—an Islamic Republic. 
Whereas previously the ulema had a recommendatory role on legislation, the new 
constitution established them as supreme religious leaders. Additionally, Khomeini 
removed the standard calendar used by the monarchy, replacing it instead with an Islamic 
calendar. The goal of this was to provide “a means to negate and contradict the ideology 
of the monarchy” (Moaddel, 1993). This turn of events was not expected by the US. It 
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would not be until the Clinton administration, forty-seven years later, that the US 
accepted responsibility for the 1953 coup that dramatically hindered Iranian political 
development. According to Iran scholar Mark J. Gasiorowski, “had the coup not 
occurred, Iran's future would undoubtedly have been vastly different”.  Kinzer supports 
this, saying “the US role in the coup...was decisive for the future of US relations with 
Iran” (Kinzer, 2003).    
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Chapter Two: 
Blowback  
(1960-1980) 
“Blowback does not mean simply the unintended consequences of 
foreign operations. It means the unintended consequences of foreign 
operations that were deliberately kept secret from the American public, 
so that when the retaliation comes the American public is not able to 
put it in context, to put cause and effect together. This leads to 
questions like, ‘Why do they hate us?’” 
 
         -Chalmers Johnson, CIA 1967-1973 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
To this day a debate continues as to what exactly America’s motives were for initially 
intervening in Iran after World War II—which, to some, represents the beginning of US-
Iran relations. Others, including many Iranians, consider the CIA’s overthrow of 
Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 as the start of the long and checkered relationship.  As 
was discussed in the previous section, Iran did initiate the first overture to the US to help 
assist in a land dispute between its two occupying powers, Russia and Britain. However, 
as the US inserted itself, its interests in Iran’s affairs—both politically and for its oil 
rights—began to take form over the course of several years, ultimately establishing a 
mutual dependency in which the US needed Iran as an ally in an important region, and 
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Iran needed the US in order to establish itself as a great power. The result was a 
revolution, in which America’s dreams of having Iran as their “second pillar” in the 
Middle East was crushed; and a 444-day hostage crisis that stood as a testament to Iran’s 
resentment of US intervention, which served as the event that would terminate any form 
of diplomacy between the two countries.   
 In this section I discuss US-Iran relations, post-Mossadegh. I also discuss social 
and political life under Reza Shah Pahlavi, including pivotal events that facilitated the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979. I pay close attention to the US embassy crisis of November 
4, 1979, as it determined the future of US-Iran relations. One important event following 
the severance of diplomatic relations between the US and Iran was the Iran-Iraq war of 
1980. Finally, I highlight the buildup of war between the neighboring countries, which 
was tacitly encouraged by the United States, and how it subsequently allowed the US to 
contain Iran.  
 
Forming U.S. Policy in Iran 
During the early 20th century Iran was under the leadership of Reza Shah Pahlavi, whose 
objectives as monarch was to centralize the government and free Iran from foreign 
interest. The latter was unlikely, as Iran had been forced to cooperate with the two 
occupying powers, Britain and Russia. Iran’s economy was divided: The British 
controlled southeastern Iran, which was the site of Iran’s vast oil fields; and Russia had 
the northern territory. Whereas the British gave Iran a small percentage of the profit made 
from the oil produced, Russia established itself as Iran’s primary trading partner.  
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An early map from the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Under this convention, Persia, as it was then 
known, would be split into three zones: A Russian zone in the north, a British zone in the southeast, while 
the remaining land was a neutral “buffer zone”.  Map courtesy of The Strangling of Persia (1912) by 
William Morgan Shuster.  
 
 
This worked towards Iran’s detriment, as it ensured Iran’s dependence on an outside 
power.  Reza Shah then decided to turn to the US for assistance: The US was the new 
hegemonic power, yet it did not have the long history of colonialism and imperialism that 
the previous great powers had. Reza Shah felt Iran could ask the US to intervene and 
force Russia and Britain to scale back its consumption of Iran’s resources. Ideally, Iran 
would establish a fairer agreement with both countries, while maintaining a higher level 
of autonomy, which would allow Iran to grow economically. The US accepted Iran’s 
request, and in 1942 formal talks began among the Great Powers. The US insisted that 
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Iran be able to operate with less restriction than Russia and Britain had been allowing. 
Showing deference to the new hegemonic power, Russia and Britain ceded, giving Iran 
more control over the use of its oil, and also allowing them to extend their trading with 
other countries.   
 The first special emissary to Iran was Patrick J. Hurley. Under Roosevelt, Hurley 
was sent to mediate the discussions between Iran, Britain and Russia. During his time 
spent in Iran, he began to see how Iran could be a strategic partner for the US. In a 
memorandum to Roosevelt, Hurley explained how the conflict between the Russians and 
the British could actually work in America’s favor. He asserted that, in all probability, the 
two would cancel each other out, thus allowing the US to play a “strong, independent role 
in Iran” (Kuniholm, 1980). In assessing its options the US began to consider its interests 
with Iran. Also, as the Cold War was just beginning, the US began to have reservations 
about allowing Russia to stay in Iran: 
American-Russian relations…were impeded not only by 
language, but by Russian standoffishness, and by the 
emerging belief that the Soviets were scheming to take over 
all of Iran” (Kuniholm, 1980).  
 
In an expressed desire to promote “lasting peacetime conditions in Iran”, the US put its 
support behind the British. In another memorandum, Hurley discussed how the US could 
“transform Iran’s destiny” by becoming an ally of the US. Roosevelt was receptive to this 
idea, and continued developing policy in Iran.  
 It was proposed that the US must ensure peace and controlled autonomy of the 
Iranian monarchy, while also recognizing Iran's value as a supply route, its strategic 
location, and its abundance of petroleum. More importantly, US diplomats stationed in 
Iran pointed out that Iran “constituted a test case for the good faith of the United Nations 
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and their ability to work out among themselves an adjustment of ambitions, rights and 
interests which would be fair not only to the Great Powers...but also to the small nations 
associated with them”. As the hegemonic power, the US alone felt responsibility for 
freeing Iran from the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry. They sought to do this by 
encouraging an independent, positive program of economic and professional assistance 
that would reduce “postwar friction”, and help make the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
effective.   
 In the early stages of implementing policy towards Iran, the US diplomats 
involved were unclear as to what these policies were supposed to achieve. Roosevelt felt 
that America’s top priority should be to promote the American model of self-government 
and free enterprise—essentially an assumption that Western values would prevail, and the 
general welfare of Iranian people would be assured. If this were to work in Iran, then it 
would serve as a model to be used with all nations suffering from monopolies, aggression 
and imperialism (Kuniholm, 1980).  
 
Iran Under the Shah 
The years following the overthrow of Mossadegh were bleak for Iran. The people were at 
the mercy of the power-hungry shah, who had taken steps to consolidate his power by 
eliminating any oppositional forces established during the Eisenhower administration. 
The Tudeh party, which was his primary supporter toward the end of his career, was 
disbanded by royal decree: of the captured members, 27 were executed, 134 were 
imprisoned for life, 119 were sentenced to 15 years in prison, and 115 were placed in 
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solitary confinement (Ramazani, 1987). It should be mentioned that the shah 
implemented these measures with full US consent.  
 Moreover, the US played a significant role in building up Iran's security and 
intelligence. In 1957, the US, British intelligence, and Israeli intelligence created 
SAVAK—the Iranian intelligence agency and secret police. SAVAK was the main arm of 
the Shah's repressive regime. Known for inhumane methods of punishment, SAVAK did 
not confine itself to physical torture: It also engaged in censorship of media and 
universities, shadowing, harassment, and other activities. Almost all of these methods 
were used against those considered to be intellectual dissidents, which included college 
professors, journalists, and activists. According to Ann Lambton, an Iranian scholar, anti-
American sentiment was high from this point forward. She asserts that even British 
relations were preferred because “they at least bothered to learn Persian, and were by and 
large respected, if not liked”. America was accused of “throwing money about in Iran to 
little purpose and indeed of positively encouraging corruption”. The Americans 
themselves were aware of this sentiment, and it served as a catalyst for redoubling efforts 
to adopt a more “robust attitude towards their Iranian interlocutors” (Ramzani, 1987) 
One event that reinforced this negative sentiment was the US push towards land 
reform in Iran. In 1960, the US impressed upon the shah that the country's social structure 
was in need of a “fundamental change if the new dynasty was to survive and not succumb 
to communism”. So began what is referred to as the White Revolution. This entailed an 
“exercise in Bonapartism”, in which “feudal tenants were replaced by small landowners 
with a vested interest in maintaining and defending the land, cultivating both economic 
regeneration and nationalism” (Ansari, 2007). The shah readily agreed to this because, as 
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he saw it, it would be an opportunity to disenfranchise the aristocracy and further 
centralize his power. But the outcome of the land reform was not quite what the US 
expected. The immediate result was the “alienation of both the landed aristocracy and the 
ulema”. Moreover, the reform proved to be detrimental to both the shah and the US:  
Both groups had been essential to facilitating the overthrow 
of Mossadegh in 1953 and were vital to the domestic 
sustenance of the institution of the monarchy. In attacking 
them, the shah was alienating the pillars of his regime with a 
view to replacing them with a grateful enfranchised 
peasantry. He grew more dependent on the US, while 
America, increasingly divorced from alternatives in Iran, 
grew more dependent on him (Ansari, 2007).  
 
As a result of US dominance and its policies in Iran, tensions began to surface. 
Mainly they lay with the various Islamic groups who felt Iran was drifting away from the 
teachings of Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini, an influential cleric that was exiled following 
the overthrow of Mossadegh, specifically disputed the separation between religion and 
government. As he saw it, though the clerics served as arbiters of legislation, their role 
was not substantial enough for an Islamic republic. In the mid-seventies he was living in 
France, but still had significant influence in Iran, where he had begun advocating for the 
overthrow of the shah and replacement by an Islamic state based on Islamic law (Shari’ 
a), as well as the rule of Faqit (Islamic jurisprudence). Furthermore, Khomeini 
denounced the US, as well as the British, as colonialists, and rejected the contemporary 
international system of states: “the world is the abode of mankind under god. State 
entities were the creatures of man's limited intellect” (Ramazani, 1987). These sentiments 
resonated with many Iranians, who were desperate to get out from under the shah—and 
America's—rule.  
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The 1979 Islamic Revolution 
The 1970's represented a particularly robust decade of diplomacy between Iran and the 
US. Under the Nixon administration, Iran was heralded as equal to that of France and 
Britain, in terms of economic growth and income. The shah was welcomed effusively in 
the US, who encouraged Iran to invest in Western companies such as Mercedes and 
Krupp in West Germany. The shah also showed an interest in pursuing nuclear 
technology. Having already acquired a research reactor in 1959, the shah was encouraged 
by the US to expand his nuclear interests with an ambitious program for nuclear energy 
(Ansari, 2007). The US was interested in helping to bring nuclear technology in to Iran 
because it would provide Iran with a “diversified electricity supply” and facilitate the 
“release of more oil for sale abroad”. In 1974, the US signed a ten-year agreement to 
supply Iran with enriched uranium. That same year, Iran announced its intention to order 
five nuclear plants from France, and Britain offered to train Iranian nuclear scientists.  
 Despite its reassurances, behind closed doors the US held reservations about Iran's 
nuclear program. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued for the establishment of 
international collaborative agents to manage and oversee enrichment, “thereby preventing 
any one (developing) country from having an independent facility”. Therefore, in 1972 
President Nixon established Iran as a policing power in the region. Additionally, he gave 
Iran carte blanche to buy “any military hardware it liked”. The shah was satisfied 
because he felt, for the first time in its recent history, Iran was getting the respect it 
deserved; and likewise, the US was happy because being an exclusive seller to Iran meant 
the military complex benefited from the shah's “extensive yearning for high-tech military 
 56 
weapons”. Reported sales of military equipment in the US had amounted to $10.4 billion 
between 1972-1976, making Iran the single largest purchaser of US arms (Ansari, 2007).  
 However, average Iranian citizens were not included in the newfound warmth that 
permeated Iran-US relations. As Iran experienced an economic boom from the 
burgeoning security and weapons sector, those that benefitted most were the American 
expatriates living in Tehran. But the American presence was weighing on Iranian people, 
who rejected the US on cultural as well as ideological grounds. American culture was 
equated to a Great Satan, who is considered in Islam to represent temptation. US culture, 
with its emphasis on material goods, represented material temptation in Iran. The shah, 
meanwhile, did not sense that anything was amiss.  
In 1978 a mass uprising broke out, in which close to 7 million Iranians turned out 
to protest against the current government. The slogans of the protestors were “Death to 
the Shah” and “Death to America”. The shah sent SAVAK, police and the army to 
neutralize any civil dissent, which bought him little time. Awaiting instructions from the 
US as to how he should proceed, the shah had no choice but to flee the country. Soon 
thereafter, Ayatollah Khomeini flew in from France to replace the shah as the Supreme 
Leader. Immediately after his return, Khomeini replaced Iran's secular government with a 
theocracy ruled by Islamic religious leaders called mullahs. The goal of the revolution, 
like that of the French Revolution, was to “reorganize the international order in its own 
image, liberating the oppressed through an export of its revolutionary ideals” (Ansari, 
2007).  
 It is clear the US—wanting to leave a “limited human footprint” in its behind-the-
scenes manipulation of Iran—overlooked several glaring warnings that revolution was 
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coming to Iran. First was the erroneous assumption that the shah's reforms, as dictated by 
the US, would inevitably stabilize the country. Savitz argues that by fostering a more 
open country, it was believed that these reforms would undermine any residual opposition 
to his government. There is in fact considerable evidence to suggest that the shah's 
reforms had actually accelerated his downfall. One reason is that the shah's reforms were 
more “cosmetic” than real: His goal was to appease domestic and international critics, 
rather than actually affecting change in Iran. Second, the state of peacefulness in Iran at 
the time (President Carter, just two years before the revolution, had toasted Iran as an 
“island of stability”) reflected just how little US diplomats knew about the situation on 
the ground. It is worth noting that it was known that dissent was brewing, but the US 
believed the shah to be “beloved and invincible”. As one CIA report indicated: “Iran is 
not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary situation”. The US had put all of its 
efforts into ensuring that Iran did not fall to communism, and those in charge of Iranian 
relations failed to understand the significance of the radical Islamic movements taking 
place (Savitz, 2009) 
Third, morale was low in Iran. The shah was seen as a puppet of the US, which 
“disillusion Iranians about their ruler and who his supposed masters were”. Additionally, 
the growing populations of Americans living in Iran were viewed by many as “disdainful 
of Iran's culture, history, and people”. Rather than creating a sense of mutual 
understanding and tolerance, the exchange between Iranians and Americans “inflamed 
Iranian’s” sense of being imposed upon by people who did not respect them. Lastly, and 
above all, the seemingly spontaneous nature by which the Iranian Revolution occurred 
demonstrates the limit of US intelligence. This was the case for several reasons. For 
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example, American officials conducting dealings with Iran rarely spoke Farsi; the fact 
that many well-educated, pro-Western Iranians (who were not representative of the 
population as a whole) spoke English was taken advantage of by American diplomats. 
Perhaps if Americans had made an effort to speak in the native language, they might have 
sensed the loss of confidence of many Iranians. Furthermore, Americans did not accept 
the unacceptable: diplomats, as well as the US government, refused to believe that 
unexpected developments—such as a revolution—could very conceivably occur (Savitz, 
2009).  
 
Losing the Second Pillar 
If the Islamic Revolution told the US that their policy in Iran was severely misjudged, a 
second incident—this one a direct affront to the US—casted them alone as the villain: the 
1979 US embassy hostage crisis. The events that serve as a direct cause of the takeover is 
as follows: First, primarily responsible was the knowledge, which was common by this 
time in Iran, that the US had orchestrated the coup against Mossadegh in 1953. 
Remembered as a man that promised legitimate reform—defined by secularism and 
modernization, unlike the Shah's cosmetic reforms that benefitted only the US—and was 
then overthrown to suit the needs of the US and its irrational fear of the spread of 
communism, young Iranian students considered this the ultimate offense to their self-
determination as a nation-state. Second, rather than flourish under its own constitutional 
democracy, the US supported the shah and his reforms, when it was clear that Iran was 
not developing as it should have been. The US, who claims to uphold the values of 
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democracy, always and everywhere, condemned Iran to live under a megalomaniacal 
monarch  
that had no interest in modernizing Iran.  
Lastly, when the shah fled Iran at the time of the revolution, he went into self-
exile to Egypt, Morocco and Panama. In October of 1979 it had become widely known 
that the shah had cancer. He asked Carter that he allowed to come into the US for 
treatment. Knowing how this would look to Iranians, and the rest of the world, Carter did 
what many considered the decent thing, but not necessarily the right thing, and allowed 
him entry. As predicted, this enraged Iranians, who wanted the deposed shah to be tried in 
Iran. Carter’s decision prompted a group of student radicals working under Ayatollah 
Khomeini to storm the US embassy in Tehran. They held 52 Americans hostage for 444 
days, from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981.  
 This incident determined the contemporary view of Iran as a dangerously unstable 
state, whose actions have proven incompatible with American values. Partly in response 
to public opinion, the US changed its approach to dealing with Iran: whereas members of 
the informed American public generally agreed with Iran's rejection of US imperialism, 
the hostage crisis distinctly changed the mood from sympathy to that of anger. American 
media followed the crisis every step of the way: Americans organized vigils for the 
diplomats taken hostage, and a campaign of yellow ribbons were passed around as a sign 
of solidarity. Pressured for an immediate response, the first thing the Carter 
administration did was to sever all diplomatic relations.  He then froze Iranian assets 
abroad, and imposed economic sanctions.  
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Forming a New Policy for a New Iran 
The role of the US in the ensuing Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) is a matter of much dispute. 
Having lost Iran so unceremoniously the previous year, the US was scrambling to find a 
new ally in the region to complement its ties with Saudi Arabia. The US reached out to 
Iraq's often-scandalized leader, Saddam Hussein. The principal actor pushing for war 
between Iran and Iraq was Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbighiew Brzezinski. 
Though to this day Carter pleads ignorance to any discussions of promoting war, 
Brzezinski has been traced from numerous sources to having had correspondence with 
Hussein. To warm initial relations, Brzezinski suggested the US allow firms to do 
business with Iraq. He also advised the US to enter into agreements for oil exploration 
and exchange health-care equipment and airplanes (Fayazmanash, 2008). Iraq had at that 
point been blacklisted as a country that supported international terrorism. So when it did 
finally become known that the US was resuming diplomacy, the international community 
understood immediately what America's motives were in encouraging Iraq to start a war: 
to further destabilize the emerging Iran, now under the guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini.  
 In light of America's role in Iran since 1953, it is clear it was trying to dig itself 
out of a self-made hole. But in trying to goad Hussein to invade Iran, not only was the US 
digging itself even deeper: it was also unknowingly fraying future relations with both 
Iran and Iraq. If the US had simply allowed Iran to grow as it saw fit under its new 
Islamic regime, events may have turned out differently. As it happens Iraq did invade 
Iran, and the ensuing violence was that of a new level in warfare. One of the criticized 
tactics by which Hussein attacked Iran was the use of chemical weapons meant to 
seriously maim and disfigure those it came into contact with—worse even than that of 
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napalm in the Korean War and Vietnam. Hussein's unrelenting and unscrupulous attack 
on Iran yielded no condemnation from the US. In fact, on September 24, 1980, Carter 
publicly pledged not to intervene in the Iran-Iraq war by declaring: “Our own position is 
one of strict neutrality and we're doing all we can through the UN and other means to 
bring a peaceful conclusion to this combat” (Fayazmanash, 2008). But the US was clever 
in hiding evidence of its collusion with Iraq. It wouldn't be until soon after the Gulf War 
in 1991 that evidence of America's vital role in the war would be made public.  
 In 1984, the New York Times and Washington Post revealed documents that 
provided undeniable truth that not only was the US instrumental in Iraq's war, but that 
they were well informed of Hussein's unethical approach. The newspapers stated that the 
US “knew in advance that Saddam Hussein was going to use chemical weapons against 
Iran, as well as exactly when they first started to use them”. Furthermore, the Reagan 
administration publicly condemned the use of chemical warfare, but “privately thought it 
was justifiable if Saddam Hussein's government survived”. The question of whether the 
US had given Iraq chemical compounds capable of developing such devastating weapons 
were also divulged at this time. The Washington Post reported that, in all probability, the 
US did not give Iraq fully formed poisonous chemicals; rather, they provided them 
chemical compounds that had many industrial and commercial uses that could be easily 
converted into poison gas (Fayazmanash, 2008).  
In 1987 the UN Security Council drafted resolution 589, which was meant to end 
the war. However, Iran immediately rejected it, as it “said nothing about who started the 
war, how it began and why it had happened”. The resolution was clearly one-sided and in 
favor of Iraq. Iran requested that it be added that Iraq was clearly the aggressor, but the 
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UN refused to do so. Because of Iran's unwillingness to abide by resolution 589, the US 
then threatened to impose a worldwide arms embargo on Iran. In the end Iran capitulated. 
Khomeini's response showed just how demoralizing this was for Iran: he openly 
described signing the resolution as being “worse than swallowing poison”.  This was a 
huge win for Iraq. But the real winner, of course, was the United States: Eight years of 
war had left Iran “so devastated in terms of human and economic losses that it could pose 
no serious challenge to the US and its client states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel” 
(Fayazmanash, 2008).  
 
Policy of Neglect 
Upon examining America's past with ideologically opposed states, one can see how the 
“othering” of a country has given the US license to impose Western values supposedly 
meant to promote the welfare of its people and protect its right to self-determination. 
Most notably in US history, Russia had been branded as the “other” for their past 
commitment to communism. Since the end of the Cold War we have entered into a new 
era, and as such, a new “other” has emerged: America's foreign policy after 9/11 shifted 
the spotlight onto the Middle East. However, Iran was not immediately put under 
scrutiny. In a speech given by George Bush on January 29, 2002, he made reference to 
Iran—which had up to that time been largely cooperating in efforts to combat Al-
Qaeda—as part of what he called the “Axis of evil”, along with Iraq and North Korea. It 
is worth mentioning that the inclusion of North Korea came largely—aside from being, in 
America's view, a recalcitrant state—from intelligence suggesting that it was providing 
Iran with nuclear technology. From Iran's perspective, they were surprised, and insulted, 
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to be bunched so haphazardly into the Axis. Until that point, Iran had been blacklisted 
due to its unwillingness to demonstrate the appropriate deference to American hegemony. 
And of course the events of the past cultivated an atmosphere of mutual distrust and, on 
some level, paranoia of the other.   
 However, what preceded this sudden interest in Iran was the US policy of neglect. 
This strategy sought to legitimize inaction through the “allocation of a recognizable brand 
name: a decision to perpetuate indecision”. The unofficial paradigm under the Clinton 
administration was that Iran could do as it pleased—still operating under various 
economic and arms sanctions—as long as it did not bother anybody else. Additionally, 
the appointment of Warren Christopher as Clinton’s Secretary of State made matters 
worse. Christopher was a veteran of the hostage crisis, having negotiated with Iranian 
captors, and many, including the media, saw his personal bias towards Iran as 
“unabashedly overt”. However, as the crisis was still fresh in people's minds, this was not 
given the attention it deserved. The US allowed personal antipathy to dictate policy 
toward Iran; and the policy of neglect grew stringent still (Fayazmanash, 2008). 
 In 1992 Christopher fiercely advocated for a sanction called the Iran-Iraq Non-
Proliferation Act. The act stated that the US would “oppose and urgently seek the 
agreement of other nations to oppose any transfer of technology” to Iran. The veiled 
subtext of this act was meant to prevent Iran from acquiring technology that would enable 
it to develop biological or nuclear weapons. This act had larger implications for US 
policy towards Iran: it represented a paradigm shift that would influence the Bush 
administration and his branding Iran as a “rogue” state. 
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Origin of the “Rogue State” in the Dominant U.S. Narrative 
With the Cold War coming to a close in the early 1990s, the United States found itself 
with a fully formed defense apparatus that had been growing steadily since the 1950s, but 
with no one to direct it against. Policymakers entering the post-Cold War era had no 
clearly defined enemy, or other, against which security interests could clearly be defined. 
Additionally, reproductions of “prior ontological assumptions” persisted in dictating how 
US national security should be shaped. Suddenly finding themselves in an uncertain 
environment, policymakers drew upon “existing practices and policy goals to seek to 
maintain the status quo” (Homolar, 2012). Alexandra Homolar of the University of 
Warwick states that after the Cold War, the US defense community experienced a 
systemic shock that had significant impact on existing institutions, and the configuration 
of extant institutional arrangements that influenced how actors responded to structural 
crises: 
While conflicts may suddenly come to an end and strategic 
opponents may literally disappear from the strategic map as 
the Soviet Union did in 1991, the infrastructure, institutions 
and networks that have been built up in preparation for 
armed conflict exert considerable staying power (Homolar, 
2010).  
 
Uncertainty is the biggest threat to national security. Therefore, in need of an other to 
direct its attention, the US began to recalibrate its national security narrative to a new 
enemy: Unstable Third World regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction. At the core 
of this fear is the perceived irrationality and unpredictability exhibited by regimes such as 
Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea, who were, in the 1990s, considered international 
“norm deviants” for their willingness to “employ WMDs and international terrorism to 
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achieve their goals”. Moreover, norm deviants were considered highly dangerous because 
it was believed that “they could not be influenced or contained by appealing to existing 
international standards of behavior”, especially as it relates to the development of nuclear 
or chemical weapons (Homolar, 2010). It did not take much effort to convince both 
Congress and the media—which in turn influences public opinion—that these 
unpredictable regimes were worth maintaining the existing defense budget. The Persian 
Gulf War of the 1990s was testament enough. But North Korea's bid for nuclear 
technology between 1992 and 1994 further clinched the deal. Take into account Iran's 
affront to the US in the early 1980s, and their history of acquiring nuclear technology 
with the assistance of the US and Britain in the 1970s, all of which served to galvanize 
support for a defense strategy against the Third World. Once the campaign was secured, 
policymakers began drafting guidelines by which to define a rogue state:  
• Rogue states violate international human rights norms with respect to their own 
populations; 
• Participate, if not independently engage or sponsor terrorism;  
• Finally, rogue states seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, as well as the 
means to deliver them across state borders. 
  
 Prior to the 1990s, “rogue” or “outlaw” governments were deemed as such based 
on their domestic politics, primarily as it relates to human rights violations, violent 
oppression on its own society, and were used to describe oppressive regimes including 
those of Pol Pot in Cambodia and Idi Amin in Uganda (Homolar, 2010). However, by the 
1990s the use of the “rogue state” label gradually shifted away from the domestic politics 
of a regime, to their conduct to neighboring states: essentially, any state that threatened 
international stability engineered by the US during and after the Cold War became a chief 
threat to US national security—ergo, a rogue state. The use of state-sponsored terrorism 
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as perhaps the most important rogue criteria began during President Reagan's 
administration, as he began  “rhetorically connecting the repressive nature of regimes that 
were viewed as hostile to the United States with sponsoring acts of international 
terrorism”. The linking of terrorism to rogue regimes represented a gradual shift in focus 
with respect to peripheral US security concerns, from concentrating on terrorist 
organizations per se to state-sponsored terrorism, and from the illicit conduct of domestic 
policy as the main criterion for a “rogue” in the international community of states, to the 
violation of behavioral norms in international affairs (Homolar, 2010).  
 The existence of rogue states, however, does not account for the reconfiguration 
of US threat scenarios during the 1990s. This new direction can be traced back to the 
“political bargaining processes among US policymakers over the future shape of the US 
defense sector”. Homolar asserts that this process began in response to: 
Indications of a diminishing Soviet threat and a domestic 
political and economic climate in which Congress and the 
US public increasingly demanded the rethinking of US 
defense policy in general, and the reduction of military 
budgets in particular (Homolar, 2010).  
 
But in order to establish a base of support for this new foreign policy strategy, 
policymakers needed a “overarching security narrative” that could serve as a persuasive 
rationale to justify and rally support behind this force-planning approach (Homolar, 
2010).  
 Two episodes that were responsible for providing the support needed to show the 
importance of maintaining the Cold War era defense budget were the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990, and the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-4. These were crucial to the 
promulgation of the idea that Third World rogues represented the principal threat to US 
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national security objectives. Furthermore, both episodes stood as a testament to the force-
planning community of potential regional instabilities in the less-developed world as the 
“conceptual foundations for determining size, structure and capabilities of the armed 
forces of the post Cold War era” (Homolar, 2010). Fostered by what Homolar refers to as 
“Catalytic Events”, Iraq and N. Korea helped evolve the rogue state security narrative 
from a peripheral security concern to the single greatest threat to US national security, 
“thereby providing a rationale that allowed US defense policymakers to align new threat 
scenarios with existing strategic models” as well as “furnishing a credible strategic 
rationale for resisting more radical restructuring proposals and deeper cuts to military 
spending” (Homolar, 2010).  
 Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided an opportunity for the US to show that a 
military posture designed originally for military engagement with the Soviet Union could 
prove to be effective in combating threats “posed by Third World countries that were 
armed with advanced weaponry”. Second, it validated George H.W. Bush's decision to 
send a “heavy, mechanized ground force supported by air superiority fighters and 
precision fighter bombers” (Homolar, 2010). President Bush argued this was necessary, 
on the grounds that “the brutal aggression” by Iraq against Kuwait had confirmed his, 
and most of the defense community's, argument that “terrorism, hostage-taking, renegade 
regimes and unpredictable rulers, now constituent the greatest threat to US national 
security”, as well as the entire international system (Homolar, 2010).  The Gulf War is 
important in the rogue discussion because it signaled the beginning of its application by 
key actors in the defense industry to describe potential Third World antagonists. More 
importantly, the Gulf War also legitimized the need for high defense spending:  
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The war in the Persian Gulf...provided an opportunity for 
members of Congress who were reluctant to agree to more 
extensive cuts in defense spending to emphasize that 
uncertainty would be the defining feature of the post-Cold 
War world, rather than a peaceful coexistence among 
nations. This involved a political struggle between 
competing narratives to define the nature of the post-Cold 
War era, the outcome of which has had long-term 
consequences for the making of US defense policy 
(Homolar, 2010).  
 
On April 9, 1992, the Senate voted against a proposal brought forward by Senator J. 
James Exon (D-Neb) to cut Bush's military spending plan by around $4.2 billion. This 
proposal was defeated because of the widespread Democratic resistance to deeper cuts in 
the defense budget. According to Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan), the reason 
why Democrats joined Republican Senators in rejecting deeper cuts to the defense budget 
was that past experience had demonstrated that “enemies like Iraq's Saddam Hussein 
arose unexpectedly'” (Homolar, 2010). The Pentagon made efforts to tie Saddam 
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait to a broader discourse on the threat of the use and 
proliferation of WMDs by a growing number of Third World countries. Hussein, then, 
became the scapegoat needed to fully convince any on-the-fence Congressmen of the 
time-sensitive nature of securing a defense budget. Once this was achieved, the US began 
applying it to other countries that may have fit the bill, even marginally.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this discussion is to understand where Iran fits in to the category of 
unstable rogue countries. In the list of rogue attributes listed above, it becomes clear that, 
conveniently, Iran has at some point satisfied each criterion. However, the hostage crisis 
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of 1979 allowed for the US to provide what it considered to be concrete proof on just how 
unstable and nefarious Iran—now under leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini—really was. 
Suffice it to say, at this time America's role in leading Iran to this point was largely 
unknown in the United States. Iran was headed in an uncertain direction, and the nascent 
theocracy was ill disposed to hide its contempt for the US, as well as anyone within Iran 
who challenged the Supreme Leader. This led to striking human rights abuses. Moreover, 
unlawful detentions, torture, and overall repression of dissent fell over Iran. And while it 
is quite indisputable that the US is largely responsible for this emerging Iran, the US also 
did nothing to mitigate the situation. Since then, the US severed all diplomatic ties with 
Iran, essentially writing it off as an enemy. Moreover, the US applied tough sanctions that 
affected Iran's oil and banking industries, in order to isolate it from the rest of the world.  
 This dynamic remained until 1995, when the US raised concerns about Russia's 
sale of nuclear technology to Iran. Though legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, of which both Russia and Iran are signatories, the US was uncomfortable with this 
relationship. It should be noted that it is “unlikely that the nuclear reactor built by 
Moscow” would allow Iran to develop a nuclear bomb simply because “of the low-grade 
nuclear material it would produce”, as well as Iran's “lack of necessary infrastructure for 
weapons production”. When pressed for its reasons for acquiring nuclear technology, Iran 
responded that its “motivations are entirely peaceful” (Zunes, 1997). This position has not 
changed in nearly twenty years.  
 Iran's bid for nuclear technology also supports other areas of discontent that has 
been a central tenet of Revolutionary Iran: Iran is a country with a rich history and, until 
recently, stability, and should therefore not be treated as unstable; Iran has many reasons 
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for wanting to be self-reliant, a prime example of which is the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 and 
the international community's deliberate inaction; In the opinion of Iran's leaders, there 
exists an asymmetrical power arrangement in the Middle East. The latter alludes to 
Israel's undeclared nuclear stockpile, the only one in the region. Iran has openly taken 
issue with what it perceives as a US-centric proliferation policy, in which the United 
States is in charge of handpicking which countries may or may not develop nuclear 
technology. This last point will be the subject of a larger discussion in the next section.   
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Chapter Three: 
America's Role in Raising the Specter of Nuclear Proliferation  
(1980-2012) 
 
“The irony of the present dispute between the West and Iran is that, for 
three decades up to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Europeans 
and American’s helped, in fact earnestly encouraged, Iran in the 
development of its nuclear program”.  
 
          -Adam Tarock 
 
 
 
Introduction 
My goal in previous chapters has been to demonstrate how US intervention in Iran since 
the 1940s has ultimately created the 'rogue' state the world sees today. Briefly I will 
reiterate these points. The period between the 1940s-1960s illustrates how the seeds of 
the theocracy, lead by the ayatollahs, was sown in Iran. Largely responsible is the United 
States, whose support of Reza Shah Pahlavi after the 1953 overthrow of Mohammad 
Mossadegh ushered in a period of uneven development and growing social stratification 
in Iran.  Economic reforms meant to boost the US economy, coupled with the 
dissemination of the sordid knowledge of America's role in installing the shah, caused a 
severe and multi-faceted backlash that provided a window for the clerical class (ulema) to 
seize the dissatisfied population's attention and encourage a 'rally round the flag' 
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movement, which ultimately gave rise to the ayatollahs. This also coincided with the 
beginning of the end of bilateral relations between Iran and the United States.  
 The second chapter—1960s through 1980s—highlights specific incidents that 
have created the state of dual intransigence that exists. One important event is the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, in which 7 million Iranians called for the end of the shah's rule, 
resulting in the removal of US presence. The second event was the US embassy hostage 
crisis. This was perhaps the single most important event in terms of shaping the dominant 
US narrative of Iran as “deviant” or “rogue” state.   
 In this chapter, I discuss Iran's reasons for acquiring nuclear research and 
materials in the face of international opprobrium. I will argue that in order to fully 
understand Iran's position, it is necessary to understand which events were precipitating 
factors in Iran's current bid for nuclear technology. These reasons are, respectively, 
security, prestige, and imitation of Israel, the only country in the region that has gone 
nuclear.  
 Using Iran and Israel and case studies, I argue that both nations historically have 
commensurate reasons for pursuing nuclear capabilities, citing these similarities through 
background on each country’s need for nuclear power. To frame my argument, I use Rene 
Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, as explained by Vern Redekop in his book From 
Violence to Blessing (2002) in which he explains “we form desires by imitating the 
desires of others”. Moreover, “we not only imitate the behavior of others, but we have a 
deep impulse to copy the interiority of others” (Redekop, 2002). In using Israel and Iran’s 
nuclear programs as case studies, it becomes apparent that it was not a decision reached 
arbitrarily by either country to acquire nuclear technology. Quite the contrary—there are 
 73 
issues of security and deterrence, and international prestige, both of which fall under the 
rubric of mimetic desire.  
 In this section I demonstrate that Iran’s nuclear program serves three purposes:  
• Security and deterrence: during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), 
Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons that were indirectly supplied by 
the United States on Iran. The results were striking and horrifying. Since 
the conflict, Iran’s government has vowed never to be vulnerable as they 
were. In contemporary affairs, Iran’s insecurity is far from assuaged since 
the deposition and death of Saddam Hussein. The threat now lies on the 
only nuclear country in the Middle East—Israel; 
 
• International prestige, status, and pride: Iran is a country with a 
rich history that has, in its view, been stunted in terms of international 
participation. Acquiring nuclear capabilities, for whatever purpose, could 
“enhance [Iran’s] prestige and status not only in military terms, but in 
other ways” (Alexander, 2004);  
 
• Finally, I argue that Iran and Israel’s bid for nuclear technology is a 
form of Mimetic Desire: Since the late 1950s Israel has been nuclear in an 
unofficial, or “opaque”, capacity. Though the US was initially reproachful 
of Israel's bid for nuclear arms, a deal was reached in which Israel was 
allowed to develop nuclear weapons with the help of France and Norway 
on the condition it had to maintain an undeclared status. Resentful of this 
uneven distribution of power, I argue that Iran currently uses Israel as the 
Model by which to replicate.   
 
 Dr. Jeremy Salt asserts that Iran perceives the current configuration of nuclear 
powers as an asymmetric power distribution, in which the US alone gets to decide which 
states are allowed to have nuclear capabilities, and which are not. The Iranian 
government considers this decree as “discriminatory treatment”, or “treatment [of Iran] as 
a second-class citizen” (Salt, 2012). Furthermore, Iran argues that it has historically been 
either a pawn for US interests in the region, or else deliberately brought into conflict in 
order to diminish its international standing. Similarly, Israel’s need for a nuclear bomb 
stems from the shadow of the Holocaust: Israel wanted to ensure Jews were not as 
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vulnerable to an antagonistic third party as they were when six million Jews were brutally 
exterminated in World War II. Therefore, the argument could be made that Israel’s 
nuclear ambitions were created as a response to surrounding Arab states that may have 
been planning a retaliatory attack on the new country on behalf of the Palestinians.  
 However, though this is a satisfactory argument, it is incomplete. In acquiring the 
bomb, Israel could not only use it for deterrence purposes, in a sense staving off any 
unwanted enemies, but also the bomb was important in securing Israel’s credibility as a 
new country — in other words, elevating it to the status of a major international player. 
Iran, I argue, has been pursuing the same path to achieve the status of a respected world 
power. In short, Israel chose the United States as the Model by which to imitate in order 
to become a major international player in global politics. Likewise, Iran has chosen Israel 
as their Model. But as I demonstrate, there are many striking parallels between the events 
surrounding both countries’ bids for nuclear technology; yet because of the protractedness 
of the US-Iran conflict, Iran has not received the same treatment Israel did when it began 
its nuclear program in the 1950s.  
 
Israel’s Nuclear Program (1958 – 1970) 
The Israelis began constructing a nuclear center in 1958 in Dimona, a city in the Negev 
desert. The US would not become aware of this until 1960. Though virtually 
unconditionally supportive of Israel, the US attempted to discourage the Israeli 
government from a nuclear path. This reflected John F. Kennedy’s foreign policy at the 
time — the Cold War — that stressed global nonproliferation. Israel’s argument, 
however, was compelling and irrefutable: From the point of view of the US, Israel was a 
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“small and friendly state surrounded by much larger enemies [Arab states] vowing to 
destroy it” (Salt, 2010). The need for a nuclear arsenal, therefore, was justified. Israel 
determined that becoming a nuclear power, like the existing Great Powers, but 
specifically the US, was necessary for its security. According to Redekop, Israel’s 
determination to emulate the US is indicative of Mimetic Desire: “We choose Models to 
imitate. From them we pick up clues about the satisfiers necessary to meet our needs for 
meaning, action, connectedness, security and recognition” (Redekop, 2002). The US, 
however, felt Israel would be safer without nuclear arms than with them; this, again, goes 
along with the reasoning that one country with a nuclear arsenal may provoke others in 
the region to do the same. In 1967, around the time of the Six-Day War, the US learned 
that Israel had crossed the nuclear threshold. Lyndon Johnson sought to enlist Israel into 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state, but Israel was resistant. In her essay 
“When an Ally Goes Nuclear: The Nature of the American Response to the Israeli 
Nuclear Program” (2007), Maria Zaitseva of Cornell University discusses the response of 
the US in learning that Israel, independent of the US, was developing nuclear technology. 
She labels the three stages of America’s response “Ambivalence”, “Bargaining” and 
“Acceptance”, which took place approximately between 1958 and 1970.  
  
1. Ambivalence 
When the US first became of aware of Israel’s secret nuclear program it was in its 
nascent stage. Israel provided verbal assurance to the US that its intentions were for 
“entirely peaceful purposes”; furthermore, it would serve to “develop scientific 
knowledge and thus to serve the needs of industry, agriculture, health and science”. 
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However, rather than turning to the US for materials, as Israel lacks the raw materials 
necessary to start a nuclear program, they imported them from France and Norway 
(Zaitseva, 2007).  
2. Bargaining 
 By the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson, the US began to devise ways to 
encourage Israel to abandon its nuclear program. The belief in the US was that it could 
exercise a certain amount of leverage over Israel, such as inspections of the Dimona 
nuclear facility, and the “linkage between the sales of advanced American military 
equipment and technology to Israel and the nuclear issue”. A third point of leverage was 
in the “security guarantees the US implicitly provided since Israel’s inception” (Zaitseva, 
2007). Also at this time, the US Atomic Energy Commission began to question the true 
purpose of Israel’s nuclear program. In a memo to the State Department, it stated that:  
 The Israeli government had no intention to undertake the 
development of production of nuclear weapons but could 
not be expected bind themselves to an undertaking on this 
point forever, especially if circumstances changed (Zaitseva, 
2007). 
 
Regardless of the implications of this message, the US was intent on keeping the news 
quiet: More important than deterring Israel was making sure the surrounding Arab states 
did not learn of its nuclear program, as it might lead to certain Arab states feeling the 
need to go to the Soviets to supply them with nuclear weapons of their own (Zaitseva, 
2007).  
 Utilizing the first mode of US leverage against Israel, the US requested an 
inspection of the Dimona facility. However, Israel retained strict control of the inspection, 
from “timing, access to specific areas, the choice of accompanying personnel, the length 
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of inspections, and permitted note-taking”. Unsurprisingly, the inspection yielded no 
evidence that Israel was developing nuclear weapons. According to Zaitseva, the reason 
US leverage fell short was due to the fact that Israeli scientists were denying access to 
any part of Dimona that would reveal incriminating evidence. She goes on to speculate 
that this was in fact part of a “semi-formalized charade” in which the Americans allowed 
themselves to believe they were “making headway in their attempt to thwart the Israeli 
nuclear program”. Israel, meanwhile, in an attempt to appease the US, formulated its 
official nuclear policy, stating it would “not be the first country to introduce nuclear 
weapons in the Middle East” (my emphasis). Far from appeasing the US, this policy 
further complicated the issue by obscuring the meaning of the word “introduction”. For 
the Americans it meant physical possession of nuclear weapons, whereas for Israel it 
meant the actual use of weapons in a conflict situation (Zaitseva, 2007).  
3. Acceptance  
 There was little the US could do to deter Israel, so the US decided to uphold its 
undeclared nuclear status. Moreover, the US resolved to stop insisting in private that 
Israel sign the NPT; to lend public support for Israel's opaque position on the nuclear 
issue; not to pressure Israel to reveal its nuclear status; and not to couple the nuclear 
question with any other issues in the US-Israeli relationship, such as arms sales. Israel, on 
the other hand, promised the US that in return it would not “disclose publicly its nuclear 
status” and not to “test a nuclear device” (Zaitseva, 2007). This understanding was 
pivotal for US-Israeli relations, as well as America's current and future non-proliferation 
policy. Policymakers began to mitigate Kennedy's global proliferation norms to include 
strong democracies, arguing, “They are our friends and are like us, and can be trusted”. In 
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fact, the US seemed to change its position on nonproliferation altogether by deciding that 
“the increased ability of Israel to defend itself is important to the security of the United 
States”, adding that “a strong and self-sufficient Israel was...in line with American 
national interest” (Zaitseva, 2007).   
Therefore, largely based on the decision to support Israel's undeclared nuclear 
program, the US continued promoting Kennedy’s global nonproliferation agenda, but 
tailored it so that it became a decision based on a country-to-country basis, rather than an 
absolute policy. This shift did not go unnoticed by Iran, which, forty years later, would 
challenge the legitimacy of this policy. Iran’s main argument is that the asymmetrical 
power distribution in the Middle East should not go on. In other words, if Israel gets a 
bomb, so should Iran. Redekop’s discussion on Selfness as a Function of the Self-Other 
Relationship asserts that a “sense of what we aspire to...is formed in relation to the other 
and the appraisal of where we are...is likewise formed in relation to the other” (Redekop, 
2002). In the case of Iran, Israel’s possession of nuclear technology became the Model to 
which it should aspire to replicate.  
 
Iran’s Nuclear Program (1960 – 1980) 
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities goes as far back as the 1960s. Ironically, the United 
States was the first country to help Iran acquire nuclear technology: It supplied Iran with 
a five-megawatt research reactor that began operation in 1967. In 1968 Iran signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ratified it in 1970 (Ozcan, 2009). Article IV 
of the treaty recognizes the signatory’s ‘inaliable right’ to “develop research, production 
and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and to 
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acquire equipment, materials and scientific and technological information” (Tarock, 
2006). US encouragement of an Iranian nuclear program can be attributed to the fact that 
Iran had strategic importance: Iran had 200 miles of common border with the USSR and 
it was viewed as an important shield against communism in the region. It is noteworthy to 
mention that Israel supported Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which made Israel, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia “the pillars of the Western powers in the Middle East, with the latter two reliable 
suppliers of oil to the West” (Tarock, 2006).  
From the perspective of the US, Iran, under the US-installed shah, was a good 
candidate for receiving assistance in acquiring the technology necessary for producing 
nuclear energy, and thus “reducing its own energy needs for oil reserves”. Preserving 
Iran’s vast oil reserves was of vital importance to the US, which encouraged Iran to 
expand its non-oil energy base because “Iran needed not one but several nuclear reactors 
to acquire the electrical capacity for its industrial development”. Additionally, Iran made 
an agreement with German and French contractors: Germany’s Kraftwerk Union agreed 
to build two 1,200-megawatt reactors at Bushehr, while a French company agreed to 
supply two 900-megawatt reactors. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology also 
signed a contract with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to “train the first 
cadre of Iranian nuclear scientists in 1975” (Ozcan, 2009).  According to declassified 
confidential US government documents, President Ford and the shah reached in 
agreement, called “The US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement” (1978), by which the 
Iranian government planned to purchase eight nuclear reactors for electricity generation 
purposes (it should be noted the agreement was started under President Ford but carried 
out during the Carter administration). The agreement was designed to “facilitate Iranian-
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American nuclear cooperation, including the purchase of equipment and material from 
the United States and help in the search for uranium deposits” (Ozcan, 2009).  
However, Iran’s nuclear ambitions were scrapped along with the dissolution of 
US-Iran relations following the Islamic Revolution. The primary factor contributing to 
Iran’s decision to abandon its nuclear program was the political upheaval that took place 
before and after the revolution. Both the first prime minister after the revolution, Mehdi 
Bazargan, as well as Ayatollah Khomeini, concluded that Iran did not need nuclear energy 
and discontinued the project. By 1979, Iran had had one nuclear reactor, Bushehr 1, 
which was at 90 percent completion, with 60 percent of its equipment installed; and 
Bushehr 2 was at 50 percent completion. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq bombed Iran’s 
nuclear reactors and research centers six times. Iran’s isolation notwithstanding, Iran’s 
need for electricity expanded after the war. President Rafsanjani tried to revive the 
nuclear program, seeking international technical assistance and collaboration from 
Germany, Argentina, Spain, Poland, Italy and the Czech Republic. These attempts, 
however, were “prevented by the United States as part of the dual-containment policy” 
(Ozcan, 2009).  
 
Iran’s Reinvigorated Interest in Nuclear Development 
The 1980 Iraqi invasion in Iran was the result of Saddam Hussein’s fear of how the new 
Shi’a Islamic order that had come to rule Iran would affect Iraq’s internal situation, given 
Iraq’s “Shi’a majority and the existence of [the Da’wa] that sought to overturn Baathist 
rule by violent means”. Additionally, Iraq saw Iran’s new theocratic regime as being 
vulnerable due to the nascence of its transitional government, and attempted to shape 
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Iran’s politics to Iraq’s advantage (Hilterman, 2010). Though Hussein’s ambitions were 
ultimately fruitless, it is nonetheless important to emphasize how unrelenting his efforts 
were to undercut the new regime in Iran, as well as how it helped shape the Iranian sense 
of isolation and the need to become self-sufficient. Worst of all, from Iran’s perspective, 
was the knowledge that the US indirectly supplied Iraq with the capability to develop 
chemical weapons. The US also supplied Iraq with key intelligence that allowed the Iraqi 
armies to direct chemical strikes more effectively at Iranian staging areas (Hilterman, 
2010).  
 Finally, there was the inaction of the international community: “There were 
perfunctory condemnations by the UN, which, when it either could not or would not 
identify the culprit”. For Iran, this was the latest in a series of “Western-instigated 
attempts to thwart its ambitions in the Gulf” (Hilterman, 2010). This was viewed as 
retaliation from the US, along with the broader international community, for Iran’s 
perceived intransigence, specifically in ejecting the US from the country, thus spoiling 
America’s grand plans for Iran. According to Joost Hilterman, the global silence 
surrounding the atrocities being perpetuated by Saddam Hussein, sanctioned and aided by 
the US, is “particularly unconscionable, but perfectly understandable when one considers 
Iran’s ostracizing (Hilterman, 2010).    
 One could also view the Iran-Iraq war as another unexpected consequence of US 
intervention. Hilterman asserts that Iran, rather than protesting the lack of assistance from 
the international community, utilized it as a means to rouse a sense of national cohesion:  
 
Having no true choice, Iran turned its sense of abandonment 
into a badge of honor and an opportunity to mobilize support 
for the regime, foster economic self-sufficiency and develop 
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its own defenses in the absence of international enforcement 
of Iraq’s treaty obligations, for example, those pertaining to 
chemical warfare (Hilterman, 2010).  
 
The unintended consequences, or blowback, have been multifaceted. In an attempt to 
contain Iran by choosing to support the Hussein regime, the US did three things: (a) 
diminished its credibility as a peace-seeking nation by providing Hussein with chemical 
components used against Iranians; (b) encouraged the introduction of a new and 
dangerous generation of chemical agents on the battlefield; and (c) set off a race between 
Iran and Iraq to develop biological and nuclear weapons (Hilterman, 2010).  
 In light of this, the conflict between Iran and Israel is considered a large factor in 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But as I have demonstrated, Iran’s need to acquire nuclear 
capabilities is symptomatic of other deep-rooted issues. It also points to what Redekop 
describes as mimetic rivalry. Essentially, he states that mimetic rivalry begins with 
mimetic desire: The international community is refusing to allow Iran to join the Nuclear 
Club, of which Israel is a member. According to Redekop, the Model (Israel) is closely 
identified with the object it “jealously keeps for [itself]”, which leads to a “self-
sufficiency and omniscience that the subject can only dream of acquiring”. The end 
result, Redekop concludes, is that the “object is more desired than ever”. Furthermore, 
“the object becomes a satisfier to identity needs—the object must be acquired for one’s 
identity to be complete” (Redekop, 2002).  
To further intensify Iran’s insecurities, in 2001 the US invaded Afghanistan and in 
2003 invaded Iraq, stationing troops along Iran’s eastern and western borders. Hilterman 
argues that the decision to place US forces along the borders was for the purpose of 
instilling a sense of encirclement in Iran (Hilterman, 2010). Additionally, in his State of 
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the Union address in 2002, George W. Bush included Iran in his “Axis of Evil” along 
with Iraq and North Korea. Finally, the invasion of Iraq is indicative of America’s 
willingness to launch a preemptive strike in order to prevent the proliferation of WMD. 
However, to many of the hardliner members of Iran’s government, nuclear capability is 
essential to serving as a “guarantor of the nation’s independence and the regimes 
survival”. The aim of acquiring such a capability would be to deter the US and Israel 
before they can bully the Islamic Republic (Hilterman, 2010). Using Redekop’s theory, as 
the mimetic rivalry escalates, the issue becomes a question of “those who are dominated 
and those who dominate”. By this logic, having nuclear capabilities is a way to prevent 
this type of bullying from taking place. However, the drawback is that this type of 
relationship can never achieve stability; the rivalry will only escalate into violence 
(Redekop, 2002).  
 
Conclusion  
My aim in this section is to draw parallels between the Israeli and Iranian bids for nuclear 
technology. Both emerged out of deep-rooted insecurity, yet the origin of Israel and Iran’s 
insecurity varies; so too does the response from the United States. Israel’s insecurity 
came from nearly each of its neighbors, all Arab states, after its triumph in the Six Day 
War. The US was initially reluctant to accept a nuclear Israel, but eventually acquiesced, 
as illustrated by Zaitseva’s discussion of the three phases of America’s response over a 
period of twelve years. Iran, on the other hand, has historically never been an instigator of 
conflict or violence; it was rather unwillingly brought into conflicts, withstanding 
violence and instability for the purpose of serving US national interests.  
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 The examples in this section chart the rise of Iranian suspicions of US motives 
after the coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh, ushering in a period of civil and 
political stagnation. It also shows the development of Iran’s feelings of insecurity and 
isolation: The eight years during which Iran had to endure Iraqi attacks left the country 
with deep traumas that have since instilled the idea of nuclear capabilities as a necessity 
for future security. Moreover, the inaction from the international community established 
that Iran would have to become self-sufficient, which gave rise to the use of Israel as the 
Model to which Iran should aspire to become. Despite Iran’s justifiable claims for 
protection, the international community has denied Iran from developing nuclear 
technology, even for civilian purposes, citing the bellicose comments made by President 
Ahmadinejad regarding the validity of Israeli nationhood as a legitimizing reason to 
believe Iran intends to develop weapons of mass destruction, and use them against the 
state of Israel. Far from making an opinion as to whether or not the international 
community should allow Iran to develop nuclear technology — either unchecked or 
contained — it is worth noting the striking similarities between Iran and Israel’s nuclear 
programs. 
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Chapter Four: 
Nuclear Iran: The Biggest Threat to U.S. National Security 
 
“Ten years after the beginning of the nuclear talks between Iran 
and the West, each side is trying to set the stage for blaming their 
possible failure on the other while at the same time insisting that 
the only way to deal with the crisis is through negotiation”.  
 
-Mohsen Asgari 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where Should The Red Line Be Drawn? 
In August of 2012, Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney paid a visit to Israel's 
President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. His timing was 
auspicious: Israel was becoming impatient with Obama's resolve to continue to apply 
pressure on Iran through the implementation of crippling sanctions. As Netanyahu was 
quoted in saying: “Neither sanctions nor diplomacy has yet had any impact on Iran's 
nuclear weapons program”. Though he has been very cautious about openly criticizing 
Obama on foreign soil, Romney has pandered to his conservative Jewish constituency by 
standing by Netanyahu and declaring that Obama's strategy is too soft, adding that he 
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would “respect any decision taken by Israel on the matter [of Iran] if he is elected” (RT, 
2012).  
 My goal in this section is not to display a partisan slant. Rather, it is to conduct a 
discourse analysis on both presidential candidates, as well as the opinions of some 
notable policymakers and scholars. The difference between both parties' approach when 
dealing with Iran and Israel can be attributed, quite plainly, to the upcoming election. 
Moreover both candidates' attempt to secure the all-important Jewish vote—of which 
Israel is instrumental in convincing the various American-based groups, such as the 
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). I will state, however, that, though I 
fundamentally disagree with both candidates' stance on Iran, I believe the rhetoric 
espoused by Romney and Netanyahu is inflammatory and implicitly encouraging the path 
of warfare as the only option in dealing with a nuclear Iran. Obama's decision to continue 
with diplomatic means to exert pressure on Iran is, in my view, the lesser of two evils. 
Romney's support of Israel's preemptive attack strategy will have deleterious results that 
will only perpetuate the series of unintended consequences that the US has had to face. 
Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff, echoes this concern: He was 
quoted in 2010 saying a military strike on Iran would be his “last option”, and has warned 
of the unintended consequences of such a strike (BBC, 2012). Moving forward with 
Obama's plan will at least maintain the current standoff, rather than ushering in a new 
period of escalation and uncertainty. Former defense secretary Robert Gates had stated 
publicly that an attack on Iran would be detrimental to US interest, explaining it could 
“prove catastrophic, haunting us for generations in that part of the world” (BBC, 2012).  
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 At the 67th United Nations General Assembly meeting, held on September 27, 
2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu took the stage and immediately launched into a speech, 
of which the underlying message was that Israel has historically had many enemies, those 
who have sought to destroy it, but never to any avail. Iran is the new aggressor. In using a 
diagram of a cartoon-like bomb, Netanyahu demonstrated in simple terms the urgency 
needed by the international community in creating a limit for just how far Iran should be 
allowed to go in developing nuclear materials. In his speech he described the three phases 
of uranium enrichment: 1st stage is low grade; 2nd stage is medium grade; and the final 
stage is high-grade uranium, which is enough to create a weapon. According to 
Netanyahu, whose information he states comes from the reports of the IAEA, Iran is 
currently at the second stage, concluding that by spring/summer of 2013 they will have 
finished the medium enrichment, and moved onto the final 
stage. From there it's only a few months, possibly a few 
weeks, before they get enough enriched uranium for the 
first bomb (UN General Assembly meeting, 2012).  
  
 Netanyahu then asks, “Where should the red line be drawn?” He went on to draw 
a line between the second stage and final stage and declared:  
Before Iran completes the second stage of nuclear 
enrichment necessary to make a bomb. Before Iran gets to a 
point where it's a few months away or a few weeks away 
from amassing enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear 
weapon. Each day that point is getting closer...that is why 
everyone should have a sense of urgency (UN General 
Assembly meeting, 2012).  
  
 The red line, of course, represents the threshold at which the US must take a 
stronger stance on Iran—in other words, when diplomacy has been exhausted and use of 
force becomes necessary. According to Netanyahu's speech to the UN General Assembly, 
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military action will become necessary by spring or summer of 2013. This at least is an 
improvement from earlier claims from Israel that an attack on Iran was imminent before 
the end of the year (see War Dial discussion from Introduction). It also says that, though 
Israel may be giving the US time to heed its warning, Netanyahu is not “backing down an 
inch on his insistence that much harsher warnings must be delivered to Tehran” (BBC, 
2012).  
 
Power Begs to be Balanced 
At this point the central question is whether Iran—assuming it develops a nuclear bomb 
in the timeframe outlined above—would launch a preemptive attack on Israeli soil. Are 
Israel's fears legitimate? Does Iran pose an existential threat to the state of Israel? And 
finally, does the United States share Israel's unshakable certainty that Iran will launch an 
attack if it develops nuclear weapons? Going back to the earlier discussion of the origin 
of Israel's nuclear development program (see historical background, section three), Israel 
currently has a regional nuclear monopoly that Iran has claimed creates an asymmetrical 
power imbalance—allowing Israel to be the sole nuclear power in the Middle East. In a 
recent article from Foreign Affairs titled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”, author 
Kenneth Waltz asserts that such power imbalances reduces the chance of regional 
stability, whereas “by reducing imbalances in military power, the new nuclear states 
generally produce more regional and international stability, not less” (Waltz, 2012). Waltz 
goes on to point out “in no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state 
[such as Israel] exist.” Moreover, this arrangement has “long fueled instability in the 
Middle East”.  
 89 
There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. If Iran 
were to acquire the bomb, deterrence would be the likely motive. Waltz urges the 
international community and policymakers to take comfort from the fact that “where 
nuclear capabilities emerge, so too does stability” (Waltz, 2012). This, of course, follows 
the assumption that the Ayatollahs and the president are rational actors. According to 
Waltz, Israel's fear of Iran is unfounded, which he claims is “distorted by misplaced 
worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states...behave in the international 
system”. This analysis supports my broader argument, in which I assert that unfounded 
fears and misunderstandings are bound to occur when there is no dialogue between two 
(or in this case three) states. Perhaps it is unlikely to expect Israel to sit at a negotiating 
table with Iran, but the US is arguably in a better position to negotiate Iran's nuclear 
status. However, more than thirty years of punitive measures and a lack of sustained 
engagement have made this prospect seem daunting. This said, it has been difficult for the 
US to gain a clear picture of the goings-on in Iran. The US would have a much clearer 
idea if the relationship between the two states participated in direct-engagement. 
Transparency would perhaps also help to dispel the irrational actor model which the US 
and Israel believes is driving Iran's decisions.  
 Looking at the discourse analysis of Republican candidates and Israel's leaders, it 
is clear the irrational actor model, as discussed in the rogue state discussion in chapter 
two, prevails, and US and Israeli officials tend to portray Iran as being irrational and 
insulated from reality, which has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear 
deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic (Waltz, 2012). Furthermore, the 
position of the international community remains that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons it 
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would “not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would 
invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear” 
(Waltz, 2012). Yet, as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Michael Einstadt 
notes, the perception of Iran as irrational and undeterrable is “both anachronistic and 
wrong”. While Iran's revolutionary leadership has repeatedly supported Islamic militancy 
and used violence abroad to promote its ideological agenda, “Iran has also demonstrated 
a degree of caution, sensitivity to costs and the ability to make strategic calculations 
when the regimes survival is at risk” (Kahl, 2012). While a lack of dialogue makes it 
impossible to truly understand Iran's intentions, and Iran's inflammatory rhetoric tends to 
suggest an underlying aggression, it is much more likely that acquiring nuclear weapons 
would be for the purposes of security rather than improving its offensive capabilities, 
which would be an act of self-destruction. In short, despite Iran's bellicosity, the belief 
that the Iranian regime is irrational to the point that it would launch a suicide mission in 
attacking Israel is not a palatable reason for escalation. Iran, like every other nation, acts 
to secure its own preservation (Waltz, 2012). 
 According to Paul Rogers, in a proposal he authored for the Oxford Research 
Group, titled Iran: Consequences of War, the perception of Iran as a major threat to the 
US stems from the Iranian Revolution of 1979: How the Iranians could have coordinated 
such a massive effort—in the form of a revolution—under the nose of the US, and the 
US-installed shah, confounds the US to this day. As I have already discussed in previous 
chapters, having Iran as America's second pillar in the Gulf meant a guarantee that US 
interests in the region was secure: 
After the sudden regime collapse, followed by the traumatic 
impotence of the United States during the hostage crisis, and 
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bitter antagonisms to the US demonstrated by the Islamic 
Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini, meant Iran was 
henceforth a direct and persistent obstacle to US regional 
interests (Rogers, 2006).   
 
 To be clear, by “regional interests” it is safe to assume that the Gulf's vast oil 
reserves, as well as America's increasing dependency on foreign oil, is at the bottom of it. 
This directive has not changed since WWII, when the US became increasingly aware of 
its depleting domestic oil reserves. It is a large part of US intervention in Iranian politics 
in the early 1950s, which resulted in the overthrow of Mossadegh and the installation of 
the shah. Gulf oil is only becoming more desirable, and not just to the United States: 
China, a formidable runner up for global hegemony, is also in need of access to foreign 
oil reserves. Having two of the strongest countries vying for access is going to make the 
Gulf region of profound geopolitical significance in the next thirty years (Rogers, 2006).  
 
Consequences of a Strike on Iran  
Considering Netanyahu's implicit demand that military action should be taken against 
Iran by spring or summer of 2013, there is a very real chance this may actually happen. 
Many scholars and practitioners disagree, and so do I, but it is nevertheless important to 
understand what is meant by launching an attack on Iran. Furthermore, what will the 
consequences be of a strike on Iran? Who will be involved? And how will this affect the 
current geopolitical climate? 
 There are two reasons for the US initiating a strike against Iranian nuclear 
facilities. One would be to damage the overall program so that any plans to develop 
nuclear weapons would be delayed by several years. The second is more symbolic: to 
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make it clear to Iran that the US is prepared to take “significant preventative military 
action” against Iranian activities that “it might find unacceptable” (Rogers, 2012). The 
problem with both of these scenarios is they are contingent on military action. This 
means once a precedent is set by which military action is used, it would be “virtually 
impossible to maintain any relationship with Iran except one based on violence”. 
President Obama's reluctance to do as Netanyahu suggests and draw a red line indicates 
that he may very well agree that instigating violence would set off a dangerous series of 
events; namely, full-fledged war, a global economic crisis, increase in the price of oil, and 
an arms race in the Middle East.  
 Matt Kroenig, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, is perhaps one of the strongest proponents of launching a strike on Iran's 
nuclear facilities. In an article published in Foreign Affairs, titled “Time to Attack Iran” 
(January/February),  Kroenig asserts that a military strike, if managed carefully, could 
“spare the region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term 
national security of the United States” (Kroenig, 2012). Kroenig explains the problem is 
not that Iran will launch a suicidal attack on Israel, but rather that the “volatile nuclear 
balance between Iran and Israel could...result in a nuclear exchange that could draw in 
the US”. This contradicts Waltz's argument, which states that proliferation would actually 
create a balance. Kroenig, then, asserts that Iran obtaining the bomb would necessarily 
result in an escalation of the current conflict.  
 Kroenig believes the US must conduct a “surgical strike”, in which Iran's nuclear 
facilities are the primary targets. One problem with this recommendation is that Iran's 
nuclear facilities are dispersed across the country and buried deep underground. 
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Additionally, whether deliberate or not, Iran has placed its nuclear facilities near civilian 
populations, which, Kroenig admits, “Would almost certainly come under fire in a US 
raid”. Furthermore, any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities will be a surprise attack, 
which will catch many people—be they civilian or military—unaware and unprotected; 
there will be no opportunity for people to move away from likely target areas (Rogers, 
2006). Faced with this decision, Kroenig concludes that it is in America's best interests to 
carry out a surgical strike, and “absorb the inevitable round of retaliation, and then seek 
to quickly de-escalate the crisis”. Kroenig's logic rests on the assumption that an attack 
now, before Iran actually has a weapon will “spare the US from confronting a far more 
dangerous situation in the future” (Kroenig, 2012).  
 Contrast Kroenig's pro-military position to Dr. Colin Kahl, a Senior Fellow at the 
Center for New American Peace. In an article titled “Not Time To Attack Iran” 
(March/April 2012), which directly challenges Kroenig's piece, Kahl asserts that 
Kroenig's vision of a clean, calibrated conflict “is a mirage. Any war with Iran would be 
a messy and extraordinarily violent affair, with significant casualties and consequences” 
(Kahl, 2012). Kroenig has said that in order to mitigate the attack, the US must be 
explicit that it is targeting only the nuclear facilities and not overthrowing the 
government. Kahl counters this by pointing out that the leaders of Iran have “staked their 
domestic legitimacy on resisting international pressure to halt its nuclear program”. 
Therefore, the Iranians would “inevitably view an attack on that program as an attack on 
the regime itself” (Kahl, 2012). 
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Iran's key nuclear sites. Large civilian populations surround many of 
these facilities. Courtesy of BBC news, 2012.  
 
 The goal of a military strike would be to set back Iranian nuclear potential for 
several years. The best way to do this is to a) destroy as much of the nuclear facilities as 
possible; and b) kill the most competent scientists. The latter would have a much more 
substantial impact of any efforts to redevelop nuclear capabilities. Moreover, since it is 
known that many of the scientists working in Iran are foreign nationals, it would serve as 
a deterrent to the involvement of others in the future (Rogers, 2012). However, Rogers 
lays out all of the possible Iranian responses to a strike on its soil:  
 
Redevelopment of Nuclear Program   
 A preemptive strike on Iran may push the Iranians to withdraw from the Non-
proliferation treaty.  This can lead to them reconstituting the damaged infrastructure and 
working quickly and secretly toward redeveloping it in a more survivable manner. This 
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means that prior to an attack it would have been conceivable that the Iranian regime 
would settle for a “threshold nuclear capability instead of a fully-weaponized arsenal”, 
but if an attack occurs, “any prospect of Iran's stopping short of a fully-weaponized 
arsenal would probably vanish”, which would almost certainly guarantee an overtly 
nuclear-armed Iran for decades to come.  
 
Strait of Hormuz 
 In January of 2012, the EU nations agreed on an oil embargo as part of the 
sanctions over Iran's nuclear program. In response to the embargo, Mohammad Kossari, 
deputy head of parliament's foreign affairs and security committee, issued a statement 
declaring that if any disruption happens regarding the sale of Iranian oil, Iran would see 
to it that the Strait of Hormuz would be closed. The international community responded 
by carrying out naval exercises meant to display not only its unparalleled military 
superiority, but also the consequences that would follow any disruption of traffic through 
the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for 40 percent of the world's seaborne oil exports.  
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The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel that can be easily blocked to disrupt the sale of oil around the 
world. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for 40% of the world’s seaborne oil exports. Map courtesy of BBC 
news.  
 
This time Iran backed down. However, if Iran were to undergo an attack, there is no 
guarantee that it wouldn't repeat the threat to shut down the route, but this time it would 
have nothing to lose, since the initial attack already occurred. If Iran managed to even 
temporarily disrupt the flow of traffic, oil prices would increase. As Kahl explains, the oil 
market is and has been in a very precarious state, but “even in the absence of such 
escalation, a preventive or US strike could rattle markets and push oil prices higher at a 
fragile time for the global economy” (Kahl, 2012). In order for the US to ensure that the 
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oil market is not affected by the conflict, Rogers explains that the operation would have 
to be “near total in its effect on Iranian capabilities”, which would be “difficult if not 
impossible to achieve” (Rogers, 2006).  
 
Hezbollah  
 Iran could also be expected to activate its proxies in Southern Lebanon. According 
to Rogers, this would be an almost immediate response on the part of Iran. The result 
would be calamitous. Hezbollah is in possession of surface-to-surface missiles with a 
range equipped to reach most of Israel, including Dimona, thirteen kilometers southeast 
of the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Israel, of course, is aware of this and would 
respond immediately.  
 
Revolutionary Guard 
 An attack on Iran would almost certainly result in a 'rally round the flag' effect in 
Iran. Most likely the first attack would be against Guard facilities, as a way for the US to 
warn them to step down, “the effect would be short-lived, and the links which already 
exist between Guard units and Shi'a militias would be activated rapidly”. Such Iranian 
involvement in the Iraqi insurgency would result in an  
escalating US military response involving cross-border 
attacks on Iranian logistics. This would increase Iranian 
civilian casualties, cause economic disruption and also 
further increase internal Iranian support for the current 
regime (Rogers, 2006).  
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Wider Regional Response  
 Another concern—perhaps even the most salient—has to do with the potential 
backlash from the overall region. Regardless of Iran's status within and without the 
Middle East, as well as the Sunni-Shi'a divide, it is still a Muslim nation. Looking at 
America's history of involvement in the Middle East, primarily in Saudi Arabia and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, there has been significant resentment that many observe culminated 
in the attacks on September 11, 2001. Paul Rogers explains that although there is an 
uneasy relationship between Iran and the al-Qaida movement, and between Iran and the 
Arab world, any attack on such a significant Islamic republic would “inevitably increase 
the anti-American mood in the region and beyond, giving greater impetus to a movement 
that is already a global phenomenon” (Rogers, 2006).  
 If the United States and Israel decides to launch an attack on Iran, this would also 
mean the US would likely be prepared to extend it current military operations in 
neighboring Afghanistan to Iran. It should be mentioned that this would be occurring 
nearly a year after US troops pulled out of Iraq. If this were to take place, groups that 
espouse anti-American principles would be likely to respond—perhaps with violence 
(Rogers, 2006).  
  
Dual Intransigence 
It was during the Clinton administration that Iran's nuclear program was discovered in 
1994. Even then Benyamin Netanyahu warned that Iran could develop a bomb within a 
year. Clinton, however, responded not by creating dialogue, but by more stringently 
enforcing existing sanctions. Likewise, President Bush refused to negotiate with Iran for 
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their nuclear ambitions. Instead the administration articulated several preconditions Iran 
must adhere to—including permanent cessation of all research on nuclear technology, a 
full accounting of its nuclear history, and unequivocally renouncing either the production 
or acquisition of nuclear weapons—in order for direct negotiations between the US and 
Iran to take place (Maher, 2008). On November 14, 2004, Iran—along with Germany, the 
UK, and France— signed onto the Paris Agreement, which affirmed that, according to 
Article II of the NPT, “[Iran] does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons”. It 
also agreed to suspend all “enrichment related and reprocessing activities”. Most 
importantly, under the agreement Iran will suspend “the manufacture and import of gas 
centrifuges and their components” (ambafrance.org, 2012). Then in 2006, Ahmadinejad 
sent an 18-page letter to Bush, which was “framed broadly in religious terms” but it also 
rehashed American rhetoric and made populist appeals. The letter was quickly dismissed 
by the president as a “screed” and was given no real attention. Yet this was an important 
moment as it marked the first form of direct contact between an American president and 
Iranian head of government since formal relations were severed following the Islamic 
Revolution (Maher, 2008).  
 More recently, during President Obama's first year after being elected in 2008, he 
made an overture to the people of Iran on Persian New Year appealing for a “new 
beginning” for the United States and Iran. Supreme Leader ayatollah Ali Khomeini 
responded with less enthusiasm, stating it would take more than a “change in words” 
from Washington to rectify nearly sixty years of conflict (Karon, 2009). Rather than 
appearing stubborn, Iran's response to Obama's overture is, from Iran's perspective, 
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entirely justified. Khomeini has said he would judge the US by its actions and not its 
words:  
We are observing, watching and judging. If you change, we 
will also change our behavior. If you do not change, we will 
be the same nation as thirty years ago (Karon, 2009).  
 
 In short, if the United States were sincere in its efforts to forge a new era of 
“engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect”, then changes in policy 
would accompany Obama's verbal assurances. However, Obama's strategy of threats and 
appeasements is not a winning approach to achieving a new beginning. Dennis Ross, the 
State Department official who played an influential role in the Obama administration’s 
Iran policy prior to his resignation in 2011, echoes this point, arguing that rather than 
forcing Iran into a corner where it must lose face by relinquishing its nuclear ambitions, 
harsher penalties must be “tied to diplomatic outreach that includes more incentives that 
allows Tehran to back down without being humiliated” (Karon, 2009). But neither side 
wants to negotiate from a position of weakness. This has been the case for each president 
since Jimmy Carter. And it is this paradigm in US policy towards Iran that is inherently 
dysfunctional, maintaining the relationship of mutual mistrust and reinforcing the cycle 
of intransigence.  
 Instead, if a new era of normalized political relations is on the agenda for both the 
US and Iran, there needs to be a dramatic overhaul of current diplomatic measures. 
Moreover, it must be initiated by the United States. The reason for this is simple: Iran is 
used to the extreme conditions with which the US and the broader international 
community has chosen to impose on it since the 1980s. Since the decision was made by 
President Carter in 1979, the severing of diplomatic ties with Iran—along with harsh 
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economic sanctions and the freezing of Iranian assets—have achieved less than satisfying 
results for the US (Maher, 2008). In short, Iran has relatively nothing left to loose, 
whereas it is in America's best interests to reconstitute formal channels of diplomacy, or 
else risk exacerbating an already incendiary situation.  
 In his article “Informal Diplomatic Relations between the US and Iran: A 
Sustainable Strategy for the Future?” (2008), Richard Maher outlines ways in which an 
absence of formal diplomatic relations creates challenges from a strategic US standpoint. 
First, as was mentioned briefly, the US loses key negotiating leverage over Iran. One 
example Maher cites is America's inability to turn to “highly symbolic acts” such as 
recalling its ambassador from Tehran. Nor can the US threaten tougher measures such as 
cutting off foreign aid or imposing unilateral sanctions. These have all been done already 
and the Iranian regime survived (Maher, 2008). Second, the absence of formal ties invites 
misunderstandings and potential miscalculations between the parties. Since official 
government-to-government dialogue is prohibited, officials from the US and Iran must 
communicate through third-party intermediaries. One major problem with this system is 
the threat of “core strategic interest and values” that may be misunderstood between both 
parties. An example of the risk of misunderstandings relates to Iran's purpose in acquiring 
nuclear development. In the US, the common belief is that Iran is developing nuclear 
capabilities exclusively for security purposes, when in reality (as is explained in detail in 
chapter 3) Iran seeks to assert its “rightful place in the regional security system”. In other 
words, “Iranian nationalism trumps Islamist ideology” (Maher, 2008). A common 
complaint against current US policy of containment appears to affect the citizens of Iran 
much more than its leaders; in maintaining the current policies, the US “alienates the 
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Iranian people”, but it also “loses important sources of soft power by isolating Iran 
politically” by refusing to move towards normalizing ties (Maher, 2008).   
 
Prospects for Rapprochement  
In a testimony before the House of Representatives Homeland Security committee 
regarding the Iranian threat to the US, and the possible consequences of US military 
action against Iran's nuclear program, Dr. Colin Kahl of the Center for New American 
Security (CNAS) stated that diplomacy has not been exhausted, as many hardliners in the 
US have declared; that the immediate goal of reaching a diplomatic settlement should be 
to provide “sufficient transparency and assurances against weaponization efforts” while 
“respecting Iranians rights to a civilian nuclear program under the NPT”, even though, 
Kahl admits, this will be “more difficult to achieve”. He goes on to say, however, that 
unlike military action, this is the most sustainable solution (Kahl, 2012). Furthermore, 
while diplomats work with members of the P5+1 (the permanent UN Security Council 
members, plus Germany) to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear threat, Congress should 
dismiss the notion that a starting point for negotiations with Iran relies on Iran 
suspending enrichment activities: As much as the United States would like to impose its 
will on the struggling nation, insisting on such rigid parameters for talks will only serve 
to aggravate the leadership in Iran and continue stalling negotiations. Rather, for future 
negotiations the United States must cast aside the ideal “grand bargaining” strategy in 
which every imaginable point of difference is repaired, and instead switch to a gradual 
approach that focuses on mutual concessions and reciprocity, which is a far more viable 
policy at the initial states of engagement (Maher, 2008).  
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 However, the usual state of diplomacy—enmity, non-transparency, 
miscalculations—must also undergo a severe realignment if negotiations between the US 
and Iran are to create meaningful change. America must pursue a genuinely 
comprehensive and strategic approach to diplomacy with Tehran that is “grounded in the 
reaffirmation of America's commitment to the Algiers Accord” (Leverett & Leverett, 
2012). After nearly three decades of US policy towards Iran emphasizing isolation and 
escalating economic pressure have served to damage the interests of the US and its allies 
in the Middle East: 
US-Iran tensions have been a constant source of regional 
instability and are an increasingly dangerous risk factor for 
global energy security. As a result of a dysfunctional Iran 
policy...the American position in the region is currently 
under greater strain than at any point since the end of the 
Cold War (Leverett & Leverett, 2010).   
 
 One notable example that supports the imperative for a comprehensive 
realignment—or a fundamental overhaul—of US-Iran relations lies in President Nixon's 
reorientation of American policy toward the People's Republic of China during the early 
1970s. Recognizing that that a quarter century of efforts to isolate and weaken China had 
not served US interests, Nixon “recast America's China policy so that it would serve 
those interests” (Leverett & Leverett, 2010). Though the rationale behind rapprochement 
with China was different from that of Iran (the US wanted to “triangulate” against the 
Soviet Union), the element of mutual interests is roughly the same. As the authors 
explain, the main goal of rapprochement with China was essentially to align US and 
Chinese interests to deal with an array of strategic challenges. Pursuing this type of 
realignment with Iran would also align US and Iranian interests in the region. 
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Specifically, if the US advocated for rapprochement with Iran, it could conceivably 
achieve much of its high-priority objectives in the region, such as reaching negotiated 
settlements to the Arab-Israeli conflict, stabilizing Afghanistan, curbing nuclear 
proliferation, neutralizing Hezbollah and ensuring an adequate long-term flow of oil and 
natural gas to international energy markets (Leverett & Leverett, 2010).  
 
Internal Factors Hindering Negotiations  
The problem, however, does not lie solely with US unwillingness to carry out the 
necessary overhauling in order to make diplomacy a viable tool of rapprochement. The 
current regime in Iran very likely views rapprochement with the US as a threat. 
Improving relations with the US would mean not only “abandoning one of the core 
tenants of the Islamic Revolution, but also risking a broader opening to the West”, which 
may endanger the regimes control of the country (Clawson, 2009).  
The current regime originated from the Islamic Revolution. The platform by 
which the current theocracy was able to secure prominence was on the platform that Iran 
must remove itself from the auspices of the United States—otherwise known in Iran as 
the “Great Satan”. Using this platform, the Iranian regime has been able to exploit and 
enrage anti-American sentiment in Iran, masterfully engineering a powerful rally round 
the flag affect that has served to concretize the legitimacy of the government. However, 
in examining the Green Movement, which gained prominence during the 2009 
Presidential Election in Iran, there is evidence that the Iranian people may no longer fully 
internalize the principles of the government. As I have mentioned previously, one of the 
likely results of renewed bilateral relations between the US and Iran will be transparency. 
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This will not come about without a certain degree of openness on Iran's part, however. 
For decades the Iranian regime has sought to shield the Iranian population from virtually 
everything outside of its own borders; certainly everything Western and American is 
doggedly withheld from its citizens. Sanctions banning the sale of American and 
European products amplify the isolation—everything from cars to DVD's and music 
products. This insulation will likely not continue if bilateral relations are restored. Iran 
will once again be exposed to products, images and ideas of the West. Moreover, as an 
ally of the West, Iran would be strongly encouraged to allow for civil society to progress 
and express itself in Iran. With a burgeoning civil society comes the empowerment 
(however limited) of groups espousing ideas and opinions. Certainly the Shi'a doctrine 
will be questioned by a number of groups.  
 Overall, the platform of America as the “Great Satan” will be diminished; and 
with it the pillar that has allowed the revolutionary government to maintain its 
stranglehold over the people of Iran for thirty years. Within Tehran exists two precepts: 
those that believe the enmity with the US is a chief tenet of “founding father Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini's worldview and is “central to the identity of the Islamic Republic”. 
For them, making peace with the United States will undermine the very foundation on 
which their system is built. The other dogma within Iran is the “Constructionists” who 
understand the original “Great Satan” culture of 1979 is obsolete in 2012. 
Constructionists recognize that that “Iran will never be able to fulfill its potential as long 
as relations with the United States remain adversarial”. While there are certainly many 
constructionists within Iran—specifically the political elite and the youth—Iran's 
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hardliners who uphold the tenets of 1979 have “inordinate influence at the moment” 
(Clawson, 2009). In other words: 
If the United States were to engage Iran, open an embassy in 
Tehran, and attempt to reintegrate it into the global 
economy, these steps would facilitate and indeed expedite 
political and economic reform in Iran. And for precisely this 
reason, [Ayatollah] Khomeini is deeply ambivalent if not 
downright opposed to this prospect (Clawson, 2009).  
 
 
Recommendations 
  
A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. Though it is unlikely a nuclear-armed Iran would 
deliberately use or transfer nuclear weapons, the prospect of Iran with nuclear 
capabilities remains a threat to the stability of an already volatile region. Moreover, “it 
would probably become more aggressive in supporting militancy and terrorism in the 
Levant and elsewhere”, which would necessarily threaten Israel's security and 
“exacerbate an already dangerous Israeli-Iranian rivalry, raising the small but potentially 
devastating risk of nuclear escalation” (Kahl, 2012).  
 However, my purpose has been to show that though this threat exists, and Iran is 
still on the path of developing nuclear capabilities despite international condemnation, 
Iran would be more disposed to end its nuclear program through diplomatic solutions. 
Force should remain an option, but only as a last resort. For example, if Iran proves 
unwilling to participate in direct negotiations with the United States, and Iran has made a 
“clear move towards weaponization”, only then should become a viable option. Even 
then, force should be used “only if it can significantly impair Iran's nuclear program”, 
and if the international community “is sufficiently united to manage the consequences 
and aftermath of a military attack”(Kahl, 2012).   
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 Therefore, I will endorse four recommendations, as put forth by Dr. Colin Kahl, 
which outline ways policymakers should deal with Iran at this particular juncture: 
 
Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran Should Remain Priority 
 Regardless of Iran's purposes for nuclear capabilities, a nuclear-armed Iran poses 
a threat not only to Israel, but the stability of the broader Middle East. As prevention is 
paramount, the US should “help establish mechanisms for direct dialogue between 
American and Iranian leaders”. Furthermore, the US should “encourage Iran and Israel to 
adopt 'no first use' pledges and technical safety measures to reduce the risk of accidental, 
or inadvertent, escalation” (Kahl, 2012).  
 
The US Should Avoid Taking Steps that Limit Diplomatic Options 
 The primary goal of the US in engaging Iran diplomatically should be to prevent 
Iran from developing “actual nuclear weapons”, as opposed to a “vague capability that 
could include many activities technically permitted under the NPT”. The process will 
inevitably require great care and skill, but as Kahl states: “Iran's current near-threshold 
status is preferable to a threshold capability”, which is also preferable to “a fully 
weaponized nuclear arsenal” (Kahl, 2012).  
 
Using Force Should be Last Resort 
 Due to the possible consequences of using military force on Iranian nuclear 
facilities, it would be prudent for policymakers to consider employing military force only 
as a last resort and “only under very stringent conditions”. To briefly reiterate, the 
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consequences of a strike could have many unfortunate and devastating effects for US 
interests, as well as the stability of the Middle East. In regard to the latter, an Israeli or 
US military strike on Iran could “destabilize the Middle East profoundly”. As a result, 
Iran would “retaliate using ballistic missile strikes and proxy and terrorists attacks 
against US or Israeli targets”. This would result in a potentially high number of casualties 
(both American and Arab) and “further destabilizing a region already roiling from the 
Arab Spring” (Kahl, 2012).  
 
Israel Should Not Attack Iran   
 The main reason a strike on Iran is a poor idea is due to the risk to reward ratio. 
Any strike would set off a ripple effect across the region, which the US and Israel would 
be forced to deal with and contain for years to come. The reward of a strike, on the other 
hand, would be setting back Iran's nuclear program for one to three years (Kahl, 2012).  
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Conclusion 
What I provide in my thesis is a thorough and chronological outline of US-Iran 
relations, and how it all relates to the current relationship of dual intransigence, which is 
largely absent in the fields of international studies, political science and history. Every 
day articles appear debating when Israel will attack Iran, whether the US will come to its 
aid, or, if attacked, if and how Iran will retaliate. The mainstream media seems 
determined to forget America’s hand in shaping contemporary Iran, and the theocratic 
regime that exists today. Instead, the media, along with many notable public officials, 
focus on the human rights violations that have taken place, the bellicose comments made 
by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the threat a nuclear Iran poses to the rest of the 
world.  
By examining key events through a historical lens, I establish a correlation 
between foreign powers’ intervention in Iranian politics during the early- and mid-
twentieth century, showing how each of these events were contributing factors to the 
mistrust, even enmity, that exists between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
international community.  To reiterate, I trace the beginning of this relationship to the 
overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953. The purpose of the coup was to restore 
the shah as a puppet regime, essentially carrying out policies meant to benefit the United 
States. This, then, led to more than twenty years of economic stagnation, unemployment, 
and diminishing civil society in Iran. For nearly thirty years the people of Iran were 
unhappy but complacent, until widespread discontent culminated in the Iranian 
Revolution, in which close to 7 million Iranians took to the streets and removed the shah, 
as well as America’s presence, from Iran. One important point I make in this study is to 
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show how the upheaval following the revolution created a power vacuum that was 
promptly filled by Ayatollah Khomeini. Bitter by the sudden loss of one of its pillars in 
the region (next to Israel and Saudi Arabia), the United States exploited this vacuum in 
order to neutralize the threat posed by the new Islamic Republic. Moreover, I make a 
connection between the role of the US in the Iran-Iraq War—particularly in the silence of 
the international community while Saddam Hussein carried out a heinous chemical war 
on Iran—and Iran’s deep-rooted sense of insecurity. The need for Iran to become self-
reliant is a significant factor in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In my discussion of Iran and 
Israel’s nuclear programs, it is clear that not only does Iran resent the nuclear monopoly 
that exists in the Middle East, but also that the continuation of US policy of isolation, 
neglect and containment that has, historically, added fuel to the fire, so to speak, making 
progress impossible.  
The use of historical background is necessary in order to see the big picture: Iran 
has historically been a victim, a pawn in the grand schemes of the Great Powers. Though 
I maintain that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable—due primarily to the unpredictability of 
the government, but also in light of Iran’s record of supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
Assad’s regime in Syria—I strongly emphasize the need for a severe realignment of 
diplomatic measures toward Iran. In essence: end the cycle of intransigence, and instead 
the US must forgive Iran its past transgressions, and begin a new chapter in the long and 
checkered history between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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